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BECKER, Circuit Judge.
I.  Introduction
This appeal by Byron Mitchell from a
judgment in a criminal case raises
important questions concerning the
admissib ility of latent fingerprint
identification evidence under Fed. R. Evid.
702.  We adjudicate on the basis of a
voluminous record developed at a Daubert
hearing, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), and explore in considerable detail
the application of the various Daubert
factors to the prosecution’s expert
testimony.  We conclude that the testimony
passes Daubert muster, and that there are
“good grounds,” id. at 590, for its
admission.  In a related matter, we must
decide whether the District Court properly
took judicial notice that “human friction
ridges are unique and permanent
throughout the area of the friction ridge
skin, including small friction ridge areas,
and that . . . human friction ridge skin
arrangements are unique and permanent.”
App. 1472a.  We conclude that the District
Court erred in taking judicial notice, but
that the error was harmless.
We also consider Mitchell’s contention
that the District Court erroneously
excluded from trial significant portions of
his proffered expert testimony on the
unre liability of latent fingerprint
identification.  Portions of the colloquies
between the Court and counsel are less
than pellucid, but we are satisfied that
what the Court really did was to operate on
a three-tier theory of what expert
testimony was admissible: allowing (1)
specific criticisms and (2) general
reliability criticisms, but excluding (3)
testimony about whether latent fingerprint
identification is a “science.”  Within that
framework, the exclusion of evidence that
latent fingerprint identification is a science
was proper under Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
The final fingerprint-related issue
concerns the putative withholding by the
government of a Department of Justice
solicitation for research proposals directed
4at validating the reliability of latent
f ingerprint ident if ica tion .   This
solicitation, Mitchell contends, was not
only improperly and intentionally withheld
by the government in violation of its
obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), but would have been
powerful evidence, not only substantively
but also to impeach the government’s
expert witnesses who testified that latent
fingerprint identification was a well-
established discipline with a strong and
well-verified foundation.  The District
Court concluded that the solicitation was
not material under the “reasonable
probability of a different outcome”
standard of Brady and its progeny.  We
agree.
The remaining issue on appeal is
whether plain error was committed by the
admission of testimony that a key
government witness gave a statement to
the FBI and testified at a prior proceeding.
Mitchell characterizes the admission of
this evidence as improper under the
hearsay rules, Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802.  We
conclude that testimony about the
existence of a statement is not itself a
“statement”; that the testimony was not
“offered . . . to prove the truth of the
matter asserted,” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), and
thus not inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid.
802; and that, at all events, the plain error
standard is not met.  We will therefore
affirm the judgment.
II.  Facts and Procedural History
A.  The Offense and Mitchell’s 
First Trial and Appeal
This case began in 1991 when two
men with handguns robbed an armored
car employee of approximately $20,000
as he entered a check cashing agency at
29th Street and Girard Avenue in North
Philadelphia.  The robbers then got into a
beige car driven by a third person,
engaging in gunfire with the armored car
employees as they fled.  The beige car,
which had been stolen about an hour
beforehand, was abandoned by the
robbers roughly a mile from the agency. 
The government sought to prove at trial
that the robbers were William Robinson
(a/k/a “Bookie”) and Terrence Stewart
(a/k/a “T”), and that the getaway driver
was Mitchell.  According to the
government, the robbery had a fourth
participant, Kim Chester, who knew of
the plans, helped case the robbery site,
and assisted the others in spending the
proceeds of the robbery.  Chester
testified for the prosecution at Mitchell’s
trial as an uncharged accomplice.  Both
Robinson and Stewart died before trial,
and thus Mitchell was the sole defendant.
Mitchell was charged with conspiracy
to commit and commission of Hobbs Act
robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of
and carrying a firearm during a crime of
violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  In the first
trial, at which Mitchell was convicted of
all counts, the government introduced
into evidence an anonymous note that
had been left in the front seat of the
abandoned beige car, apparently written
by someone who observed the robbers
exiting the beige car and getting into a
5different car.  The note read, “Light
green ZPJ-254.  They changed cars; this
is the other car.”  On appeal, we held the
note to be inadmissible hearsay not
subject to any exception in Fed. R. Evid.
803.  United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d
572 (3d Cir. 1998).  In view of the
limited other evidence connecting
Mitchell to the robbery—Chester’s
testimony was questionable, no robbery
proceeds were ever linked to Mitchell,
and the fingerprints recovered from the
beige getaway car were identified as
Mitchell’s but in poor condition—we
concluded that admission of the
anonymous note was not harmless error. 
Id. at 579-80.  Accordingly, we vacated
Mitchell’s conviction and remanded for a
new trial.  Id.
B.  Latent Fingerprint Identification 
and the Daubert Hearing
Prior to the retrial, the District Court
conducted a lengthy Daubert hearing on
the admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 702
of the government’s expert testimony
(and Mitchell’s counter-experts) on the
identification of fingerprints found on
the gear shift lever and driver’s side door
of the beige getaway car.  This hearing
was to adjudicate a major attack mounted
by Mitchell on the government’s
fingerprint evidence.  As with any expert
testimony, some background in the field
and an introduction to the jargon is
helpful, and so we discuss the field of
latent fingerprint identification in general
before turning to the particulars of the
Daubert hearing.
1.  The Field of Latent 
Fingerprint Identification
Criminals generally do not leave
behind full fingerprints on clean, flat
surfaces.  Rather, they leave fragments
that are often distorted or marred by
artifacts, terms we explain in the
margin.1  These “latent” prints—from the
Latin lateo, “to lie hidden,” because they
are often not visible to the naked eye
until dusted or otherwise revealed—are
the typical grist for the fingerprint
identification expert’s mill.  Testimony at
the Daubert hearing suggested that the
typical latent print is a fraction—perhaps
1/5th—of the size of a full fingerprint. 
App. 435a-436a.  A “full” fingerprint is
familiar to anyone who has been
fingerprinted for identification or law
enforcement reasons: It is the print made
by rolling the full surface of the fingertip
onto a fingerprint card or electronic
fingerprint capture device.  (These prints
are, for obvious reasons, also referred to
as “rolled prints” or “full-rolled prints.”) 
A full set of full-rolled fingerprints on a
card—as would be taken during a police
booking, for example—is known as a
“ten-print card.”  Ten-print cards usually
also have space at the bottom of the card
    1In the jargon, artifacts are generally
small amounts of dirt or grease that
masquerade as parts of the ridge
impressions seen in a fingerprint, while
distortions are produced by smudging or
too much pressure in making the print,
which tends to flatten the ridges on the
finger and obscure their detail.
6for “flat impressions” or “plain
impressions,” where all four fingers of
the hand are pressed at once onto the
card without rolling.
Rolled prints and latent prints alike
are subject to artifacts and distortions,
though the problems with latent prints
are more acute because they are smaller,
and left more carelessly than full-rolled
prints, and are left on surfaces that many
other fingers have also touched. 
Appellant Br. at 10-11.  See Andre
Moenssens et al., Scientific Evidence in
Civil and Criminal Cases, § 8.08 at 514
(4th ed. 1995) (“Many latent impressions
developed at crime scenes are badly
blurred or smudged, or consist of
partially superimposed impressions of
different fingers.”).
Fingerprints are left by the depositing
of oil upon contact between a surface and
the friction ridges of fingers.  The field
uses the broader term “friction ridge” to
designate skin surfaces with ridges
evolutionarily adapted to produce
increased friction (as compared to
smooth skin) for gripping.  Thus toeprint
or handprint analysis is much the same as
fingerprint analysis.  The structure of
friction ridges is described in the record
before us at three levels of increasing
detail, designated as Level 1, Level 2 and
Level 3.  Level 1 detail is visible with the
naked eye; it is the familiar pattern of
loops, arches, and whorls.  Level 2 detail
involves “ridge characteristics”—the
patterns of islands, dots, and forks
formed by the ridges as they begin and
end and join and divide.  The points
where ridges terminate or bifurcate are
often referred to as “Galton points,”
whose eponym, Sir Francis Galton, first
developed a taxonomy for these points. 
The typical human fingerprint has
somewhere between 75 and 175 such
ridge characteristics.  Level 3 detail
focuses on microscopic variations in the
ridges themselves, such as the slight
meanders of the ridges (the “ridge path”)
and the locations of sweat pores.  This is
the level of detail most likely to be
obscured by distortions.
The FBI—the agency that made the
primary identification in this case—uses
an identification method known as ACE-
V, an acronym for “analysis, comparison,
evaluation, and verification.”  The basic
steps taken by an examiner under this
protocol are first to winnow the field of
candidate matching prints by using Level
1 detail to classify the latent print.  Next,
the examiner will analyze the latent print
to identify Level 2 detail (i.e., Galton
points and their spatial relationship to
one another), along with any Level 3
detail that can be gleaned from the print. 
The examiner then compares this to the
Level 2 and Level 3 detail of a candidate
full-rolled print (sometimes taken from a
database of fingerprints, sometimes taken
from a suspect in custody), and evaluates
whether there is sufficient similarity to
declare a match.  In the final step, the
match is independently verified by
another examiner, though there is some
dispute about how truly independent this
verification is.
The standards used by the FBI at the
7evaluation stage of the ACE-V protocol
are somewhat less concrete than the
numerical descriptions found in
television police dramas that extol
“twenty-point matches” and the like.  An
n-point match refers to a match between
an unknown latent print and a known full
print in which the examiner has
identified  n corresponding Galton points
in the correct geometry relative to one
another.  A number of jurisdictions both
outside the United States and within
seem to rely on a system where a
minimum number of corresponding
points must be found before a match may
be declared, irrespective of Level 3
detail.  See, e.g., 2 Paul C. Giannelli &
Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific
Evidence § 16-7(A), at 768 (3d ed. 1999)
(“In France, the required number [of
points for a match] used most often is 24
while the number is 30 in Argentina and
Brazil.”).   Such jurisdictions are said to
use a “point system.”  On the other hand,
Canada does not have a minimum point
threshold for identification, and the
United Kingdom recently eliminated a
minimum point threshold.  See United
States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d
549, 569-70 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting
Lord Lester of Herne Hill’s colloquy
with Lord Rooker).  The alternative
approach—which gained favor with the
FBI in the late 1940s, App. 378a—is to
use a combination of quantity and
quality: If ridge characteristics are
abundant, then the quality of Level 3
detail is unimportant; but a paucity of
Galton points can be compensated for by
high-quality Level 3 detail.  While this
has the advantage of allowing an
examiner to find a match in situations
where an examiner using a strict point-
based standard would not find one, this
flexibility comes at the price of
substituting a degree of subjectivity for
an objective numerical standard.
2.  The Daubert Hearing
The District Court held a five-day
hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993), to rule on the admissibility
of the government’s and Mitchell’s
proposed expert testimony.  The record
of this marathon hearing alone comprises
nearly one thousand pages of testimony
and a similarly voluminous array of
exhibits.  The government called six
witnesses (plus one rebuttal witness), and
Mitchell, four.  The District Court found
all the offered expert witnesses to be
qualified in their respective fields, and
neither party raises a challenge to the
qualifications, as such, of the witnesses. 
Rather, both sides’ issues lie with the
content of the testimony accepted by the
District Court.  We briefly describe the
areas of testimony of each of the
witnesses, starting with the government’s
witnesses.
a.  The Government’s Experts
Steven Meagher, an FBI special
agent, testified at the hearing about Level
1, Level 2, and Level 3 detail (as
described above), and other aspects of
fingerprint identification.  With regard to
the FBI’s practices, technology, and
operations, he testified about the ACE-V
8protocol; that the FBI does not rely on a
minimum “points” standard for matching
fingerprints (and why it does not); and
about the Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (“AFIS”) computer
system (which automates some
preliminary aspects of fingerprint
matching).  Meagher also described a
survey (which we discuss, infra) of state
fingerprint identification agencies that he
prepared and circulated for the purpose
of demonstrating that the fingerprint
match in this case was, by wide
consensus, correct.  He also described an
experiment (which we also discuss,
infra) designed and run in cooperation
with the contractor for the FBI’s AFIS
computer system, Lockheed Martin, that
would search a portion of the AFIS
database for identical fingerprints. 
Donald Zeisig, of Lockheed Martin, and
Bruce Budowle, a statistician and
population geneticist with the FBI, were
also involved in this experiment, and
both testified at the Daubert hearing. 
Zeisig also testified in greater detail
about the technical background of the
AFIS computer system.  
The government offered two
witnesses focusing principally on the
biological aspects of fingerprints.  Dr.
William Babler, of Marquette University,
testified about the prenatal development
of friction ridges, opining that unique
arrangements of friction ridges develop
in the womb within a matter of months
after conception.  He also testified to the
medical community’s accepted
understanding of the anatomical and
cellular bases for the permanence of
friction ridge arrangements.  Ed German,
of the United States Army Criminal
Investigation Laboratory, testified to the
lack of similarity found between
corresponding fingerprints of identical
twins, a conclusion established by his
own research on identical twins and
confirmed by other studies of identical
twins.
The government also offered David
Ashbaugh, of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, who testified broadly
about the development, comparison, and
identification of friction ridge skin and
impressions.  Like the other government
witnesses who were examined on the
matter (viz., Agent German, Agent
Meagher, and Dr. Budowle) he
responded that it was his opinion that
friction ridge arrangements were unique
(the “uniqueness proposition”) and
permanent (the “permanence
proposition”), and that positive
identifications can be made from
fingerprints containing sufficient
quantity and quality of ridge detail.  Dr.
Babler also opined that friction ridge
arrangements are unique and permanent. 
These propositions were the foundation
of the government’s argument that latent
fingerprint identification evidence
satisfies Daubert.
The government conducted two
experiments in anticipation of the
Daubert hearing: (1) a survey of state
fingerprint identification agencies asking
them, inter alia , if they could match the
latent prints in this case to Mitchell’s ten-
9print card; and (2) a search for identical
fingerprints using data in the AFIS
computer system.2  The specifics of these
experiments bear on their relevance as
expert evidence, and so we describe them
in some detail.
For purposes of this case, Meagher
created a survey packet that was sent out
to the principal law enforcement agency
of each of the fifty states, plus the
District of Columbia, Canada’s Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, and the
United Kingdom’s Scotland Yard.  The
survey contained three parts: Part A
involved questions about whether the
agency currently accepts fingerprints as a
means to individualize (i.e., make an
identification), and about whether the
agency regards fingerprints as unique
and permanent.  All fifty-three recipients
responded in the affirmative to both
queries.  Joint Supp. App. at 56.  Part C
inquired whether the agencies had ever
found two individuals to have the same
fingerprint; the response was,
unanimously, no.  Part C also revealed
that, in the aggregate, the ten-print
records of nearly 70 million
individuals—or about 700 million
fingerprints—have been examined
during the course of the agencies’
operations.
Part B of the survey was designed as
a demonstration of the ACE-V
identification protocol, and it used the
latent fingerprints at issue in this case. 
Part B offered each agency photographs
of the two latent prints and of Mitchell’s
ten-print card.  Agencies were asked first
to attempt to identify the ten-print card
using their own computerized fingerprint
database.  It is common practice (for
efficiency’s sake) to “filter” the database
in making an identification, by
considering only the subset of records
(by race, sex, date of birth, etc.) that are
likely to result in a match.  Meagher
requested that agencies not filter their
database for this test, to ensure that the
prints were compared against the
maximum possible number of print
records.  Of the forty-seven agencies that
responded, the only match that was found
was in Pennsylvania, where Mitchell’s
ten-print record was already on file.
In the second segment of Part B,
agencies were asked to attempt to match
the latent prints to their existing records. 
The only “hits” were made by the two
agencies (Mississippi and South Dakota)
that inputted the ten-print card supplied
by Meagher into their system prior to
running the search (and thus raised the
likelihood of a match).  Pennsylvania
was unable to run this search because of
equipment troubles, but represented that
it undoubtedly would have made a match
if its system were fully operative.
The third segment of Part B asked
agencies to perform manual comparisons
of the latent prints to the ten-print card
    2We note that these experiments—and,
indeed, much of the expertise marshaled
both by the government and by
Mitchell—required resources and
preparation that are far from typical in
federal criminal trials.
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provided to them.  This survey was
single-blind, i.e., while Meagher knew
that the latent prints had been identified
as Mitchell’s, knew that the ten-print
card was Mitchell’s, and believed the
latents could be matched to the ten-print
card, none of the survey recipients was
told any of this.  Roughly two thirds of
the agencies responded to this portion. 
Over three quarters of the responding
agencies matched both prints consistently
with the FBI’s identification.  Of those
that did not match both prints, half
matched only one print consistent with
the FBI’s identification, and half
matched neither print.  In followup
communications, the FBI either
convinced these non-identifying agencies
that a match did exist and they so
acknowledged (though it took the strong
suggestion of annotated blown-up
photographs of the prints), or otherwise
established reasons for the non-
identification (e.g., the examiner deemed
the quality of the supplied photographs to
be too poor to make an identification,
and would have preferred an original; or
the comparison was performed by an
inexperienced examiner, and on review,
a senior examiner was able to find a
match).
A critical summary point is that no
agency ever registered a “false” positive
(i.e., a positive match that contradicted
the FBI’s result):  In the first segment of
Part B, no agency matched Mitchell’s
ten-print card to someone else’s ten-print
card; in the second segment, no agency
matched the latent prints to anyone other
than Mitchell; and in the third segment,
no agency matched a latent print to any
finger other than the one to which the
FBI had matched the latent print.
The second experiment conducted by
the government’s experts was known as
the “50/50” experiment.  This was an
empirical examination by computer of a
subset of the FBI’s fingerprint records to
search for pairs of very similar
fingerprints taken from different sources. 
Finding such a pair would undermine the
uniqueness proposition, see supra page
8, that the government’s other experts
testified was well-established.  The
experiment data set was a set of fifty
thousand prints (out of about 340 million
in the FBI’s AFIS computer system). 
Rather than select these fifty thousand
prints at random, the experimenters
(Agent Meagher, Mr. Zeisig, and Dr.
Budowle) took them from the subset of
prints that were from white males and
exhibited a left-sloped whorl pattern at
Level 1 detail.  The experimenters also
ensured that multiple prints from the
same person were included in the set of
fifty thousand.  The effect of these
restrictions was to bias, from the outset,
the prints toward being more similar (and
hence more likely to contain a matching
pair).3
    3An analogy may illustrate this biasing
effect: Consider a large multicolored pile
of crayons produced by mixing several
boxes of crayons.  If one chooses a dozen
“dark” crayons at random, one is more
likely to find among those dozen crayons
11
In the first part of the test, a computer
program—using the same algorithms as
the FBI’s AFIS computer system uses to
match prints—attempted to match each
of the fifty thousand prints against the
full set of fifty thousand prints (hence the
moniker “50/50”).  Thus, a total of
50,000 x 50,000, or 2.5 billion,
comparisons were performed.  For each
print, the best match was, by an
enormous margin, itself.4  Based on
statistical extrapolation from these
results, the experimenters put the chances
of a single full-rolled print matching
another full-rolled print from anyone in
the world other than the person who
deposited the print at approximately one
in ten to the eighty-sixth power (i.e., 1
chance in 1 followed by 86 zeroes), a
very low probability indeed.
Apparently recognizing that analysis
of full-rolled prints was not particularly
germane to the question of the
identification of latent partial prints, the
government’s witnesses conducted a
second experiment.  From each of the
fifty thousand prints, they had the
computer create a simulated latent print
(referred to as a “pseudolatent print” or
simply a “pseudolatent”), as might be
recovered from a crime scene, by taking
only about a fifth of the full-rolled print.5 
They then ran a similar fifty thousand-
by-fifty thousand comparison to see how
strongly the pseudolatent prints matched
full prints from which they had not been
derived.  With one exception which we
identify in the margin, each pseudolatent
was a strong match with the full print
from which it had been derived, by a
wide margin over any other full print.6 
a pair of exactly the same color than one
is to find such a pair if one selects a
dozen crayons at random from the pile at
large.
    4We note that the comparisons were
run for each print against all 50,000
prints, not against the other 49,999
prints.  Thus, every print was assured of
having a tautologically perfect match
(i.e., itself) that could serve as a baseline
for statistical comparisons.  This was
done to quantify statistically how much
better the perfect match was than all
other comparisons.  The cases in which a
print was a strong match for a print other
than itself were subsequently discovered
to be the product of a double-entry in the
database (i.e., a set of prints from the
same person had been entered into the
database twice).  The experimenters
testified that the system’s ability to catch
this unintentional duplication bolstered
their confidence in its capabilities.
    5The pseudolatents were 21.7% of the
areal size of the full print, a figure which
Meagher determined was the average
size of a set of actual latent prints that he
had previously used for testing.
    6Meagher explained that the sole
exception was caused by a poorly created
fingerprint card.  On the card in question,
the flat impression had strayed out of the
region on the card designated for the flat
impression, and had left part of a print in
12
Statistical computations based on this
experiment put the probability of a latent
partial print matching the full print of
anyone in the world other than the person
who deposited the print at approximately
one in ten to the sixteenth power (i.e., 1
in 10,000,000,000,000,000), also a very
low probability.
b.  Mitchell’s Experts
Mitchell’s first witness at the
Daubert hearing was Marilyn Peterman,
an investigator with the Defender
Association of Philadelphia who took
statements from those fingerprint
examiners at state agencies who had
failed to match the latent prints to
Mitchell’s ten-print card in completing
Part B of the FBI’s survey.7  She
described which agencies adhered to a
point system, how many points they
required to make an identification, and
noted that the agencies that did not find a
match generally reported that they had
found an insufficient number of points of
similarity between the latent print and the
ten-print card.  Ms. Peterman also
reported on the varying levels of
experience and accreditation of the
examiners who performed the
comparisons for the agencies.
The first of Mitchell’s three major
experts was Dr. David Stoney, the
director of the McCrone Research
Institute in Chicago, a not-for-profit
organization engaged in teaching and
research in the forensic sciences.  Dr.
Stoney was, in Mitchell’s counsel’s
words at the Daubert hearing, offered as
an expert “with respect to whether a
fingerprint examiner’s conclusion that a
latent fingerprint came from a particular
individual is a scientific determination.” 
App. 763a.  The nucleus of Dr. Stoney’s
opinion is summarized in a portion of his
testimony at the hearing:
The determination that a
fingerprint examiner . . . makes
when comparing a latent
fingerprint with a known
fingerprint, specifically the
determination that there is
sufficient basis for an absolute
identification, is not a scientific
the box designated for one of the rolled
impressions.  Consequently, one of the
boxes for a rolled print actually
contained a rolled print, plus a fair-sized
piece of a flat print of a different finger. 
As a result, the strong match found by
computer was actually a match between
the pseudolatent print and the stray
portion of the flat print.  As with the
database error discovered in the first
stage of the 50/50 experiment, the
experimenters found this mistaken match
to be evidence of the robustness of their
computer system.
    7It appears that, in the interest of
efficiency, the parties consented to
introducing hearsay from the examiners
who completed the FBI
survey—primarily through Agent
Meagher for the government, and
through Ms. Peterman for Mitchell.
13
determination. . . . It is a
subjective determination
without objective standards to
it.
Now, by “subjective” I mean
that it is one that is dependent on
the individual’s expertise,
training, and the consensus of
their agreement of other
individuals in the field.  By “not
scientific” I mean that there is not
an objective standard that has
been tested; nor is there a
subjective process that has been
objectively tested.  It is the
essential feature of a scientific
process that there be something to
test, that when that something is
tested, the test is capable of
showing it to be false.
App. 765a.  Dr. Stoney opined that the
evaluation phase of the ACE-V protocol
requires the examiner to make a binary
determination: Either two prints match
sufficiently to make an absolute
identification, or they do not.  This Dr.
Stoney contrasted to certain other
forensic disciplines in which
intermediate determinations are
expressed in probabilistic terms.  Dr.
Stoney further objected to any
characterization of fingerprint
identification as having a “zero error
rate,” explaining that “something with a
zero error rate cannot be a science . . . .
[I]f we start out saying fundamentally
something can’t be shown to be wrong,
then it means that we can’t test it.  If we
can’t test it, . . . there’s no way to show
that it is wrong.”  App. 781a.
Dr. Stoney also criticized the 50/50
experiment.  He noted first the
undisputed proposition that two
impressions of the same friction ridges
will not be identical—artifacts and
distortions will invariably appear.8  In
that experiment, see supra page 10 and
note 4, a fingerprint was compared
against itself and 49,999 other
fingerprints taken from the FBI’s
database.  Hence, Dr. Stoney explained,
the simulated task modeled by the 50/50
experiment was that of matching Print 1
and (the identical) Print 1 of Finger A. 
In his submission, the task in real-world
fingerprint identification is one of
matching Print 1 and Print 2 of Finger A. 
Thus, Stoney reasoned, the 50/50
experiment as executed assessed how
much better a match is found between
Print 1 and (the identical) Print 1 of
Finger A than between Print 1 of Finger
A and Print 1 of Finger B.  A more
meaningful version of the 50/50
experiment, Dr. Stoney explained, would
    8This point also underpins Dr.
Stoney’s more general criticism of the
discipline of latent fingerprint
identification: Dr. Stoney agreed that
human friction ridges are unique and
permanent, including small areas, App.
914a, but suggested that this alone is
unhelpful on the question whether prints
are identifiable, because fingerprints are
so subject to distortion and the forensic
identification process is so flawed, App.
917a-920a.  
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have asked how much better a match is
found between Print 1 and Print 2 of
Finger A than between Print 1 of Finger
A and Print 1 of Finger B.9
Dr. Stoney further criticized the
method used to create the pseudolatent
prints in the second part of the
experiment.  Dr. Stoney explained that it
was established in the literature that
simple masking, and even computer-
generated blurring, of full prints cannot
adequately simulate real latent partial
prints.  Dr. Stoney’s ultimate conclusion
was that these experimental defects
rendered the probabilities derived by the
government experts meaningless.
The defense’s second principal expert
was James Starrs, a professor in the
Department of Forensic Sciences and the
law school at George Washington
University.  Prof. Starrs has had a long
career at the intersection of law and
forensic science; indeed, an article by
Prof. Starrs was cited by the Supreme
Court in Daubert.  See Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 591 (citing James E. Starrs, Frye v.
United States Restructured and
Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend
Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26
Jurimetrics J. 249, 258 (1986)).  Prof.
Starrs was offered as an “exert [sic] in
forensic science qualified to provide an
opinion as to whether latent fingerprint
examination meets the criteria of
science.”  App. 813a-814a.  Like Dr.
Stoney, Prof. Starrs testified that it was
his opinion that “[the current practice of]
fingerprint comparison and analysis is
not predicated on a sound and adequate
scientific basis for purposes of making
an individualization to one person from a
fragmentary print to the exclusion of all
other persons in the world.”  App. 828a.
To support his conclusion, Prof.
Starrs highlighted five aspects of
fingerprint examination that in his
opinion were inconsistent with a
scientific discipline: (1) claims to
“absolute certainty”; (2) “the failure to
carry out controlled empirical-data-
searching experimentation”; (3) a failure
to engage in error-rate analysis; (4) the
lack of uniformity, objectivity,
systematization, and standards; (5) “a
failure to show a due regard to a
vigorous and uncompromising
skepticism.”  App. 828a-829a.  In
elaborating on each of these points, Prof.
Starrs gave illustrations.  For example, he
briefly described a case of false
identification; he described some of the
subtle and non-systematized aspects of
analyzing Galton points, see supra page
6, and he criticized some aspects of the
training of new fingerprint examiners. 
Prof. Starrs also explained that he viewed
the government’s testimony and
experiments involving full-rolled prints
as irrelevant to the question of latent
partial print identification.  However,
under cross-examination Prof. Starrs was
    9We note, however, that such an
experiment was beyond the immediate
capability of the government because its
database, by design, does not have
multiple prints from the same finger.
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agnostic on whether the propositions he
challenged as unproven might, in the
end, be scientifically supportable.
Mitchell’s final expert at the
Daubert hearing was Simon Cole, a post-
doctoral fellow at Rutgers University,
with expertise in “science and technology
studies with particular expertise
regarding the fingerprint profession.” 
App. 939a.  Dr. Cole had no experience
in latent print examination.  From his
research, Dr. Cole identified four
explanations for the widespread
acceptance of fingerprint identification
evidence: First, from the earliest days of
the discipline, fingerprint examiners have
developed an “occupational norm of
unanimity,” i.e., examiners would not
publicly disagree with one another about
an identification.  Second, in terms of the
way in which the fingerprint examination
community handled the instances of
known misidentification, such cases
would, Dr. Cole explained, be blamed on
practitioner incompetence or
misconduct.10  Third was a simple lack of
judicial scrutiny—a sort of snowball
effect of string citations to cases and
treatises approving fingerprint
identification evidence.  Fourth was a
lack of an organized counter-expert
group, a notable difference, Dr. Cole
explained, between fingerprint
identification and, say, psychiatric
diagnosis.  Dr. Cole also opined that
fingerprint identification was not
scientific because, inter alia , the
fingerprint identification community had
not engaged in studies that attempt to
falsify the discipline’s premises; did not
engage in anonymous, critical (as
opposed to positive) peer review; and did
not recognize error rates.
c.  Mitchell’s Exhibits
As part of the Daubert hearing,
Mitchell also introduced several hundred
pages of documentary exhibits,
principally journal articles and other
excerpts from the corpus of literature
criticizing the practice and theory of
latent fingerprint identification, authored
by his experts and by others.  Also
introduced were the results of some
fingerprint proficiency tests, which
suggested that examiners were prone to
both false negatives (i.e., declaring a
nonidentification where an identification
should have been made) and false
positives (i.e., making an incorrect
identification).  App. 3014a, 3063a. 
Finally, the defense introduced a survey
of jurors that found that 93% agreed with
the statement “fingerprint identification
is a science” and 85% agreed with the
statement “fingerprints are the most
reliable means of identifying a person.” 
App. 3047a-3048a.
d.  The Government’s Rebuttal Witness
To respond to defense testimony
    10Dr. Cole noted that both of these first
two explanations were well illustrated by
the FBI’s survey: Agent Meagher
followed up with each agency until a
match was agreed to, or otherwise
identified inexperienced examiners as the
source of nonidentifications.
16
regarding the “occupational norm of
unanimity” among fingerprint examiners,
the government offered Pat Wertheim, a
fingerprint examiner, as a rebuttal
witness.  Wertheim testified that he and
David Grieve (who was present but did
not testify) were involved as defense
experts in a case of false identification in
the United Kingdom.  Based on their
examination of the evidence in that
case—which was both independent of
the U.K. authorities and independent of
each other—they testified, in opposition
to the prosecution’s expert, that the latent
print in that case could not be matched to
the defendant.  The purpose of this
testimony was to counter Dr. Cole’s
contentions about the occupational norm
of unanimity within the discipline.
3.  The District Court’s Daubert and
Judicial Notice Rulings
Two months after the Daubert
hearing concluded, the District Court
ruled from the bench on the admissibility
of expert testimony at trial.  In relevant
part, the Court stated:
The matter presently pending
before the Court is in reference to
the defense motion to exclude the
government’s fingerprint
identification evidence, and based
on the Daubert hearing and also
Kumho, this Court denies the
defendant’s motion.  And
pursuant thereto, this court is not
going to make a determination as
to the particular area of scientific
knowledge and technical or
specialized knowledge.
* * *
Further, pursuant to this
Court’s ruling, this Court finds
that the government’s fingerprint
evidence is highly probative and
substantially outweighs any
danger of unfair prejudice to
defendant.
* * *
We find that the government’s
expert witness—at this juncture it
appears it’s Duane Johnson [sic
Wilbur Johnson?], an FBI latent
fingerprint examiner who testified
first in the previous trial, and
those other latent experts that
testified in the Daubert
hearing—are capable of testifying
in these proceedings, and in that
regard, I am not going to limit the
defense from calling latent
fingerprint experts to testify as to
the ability not to identify or make
an identification from the
fingerprints, and I am also going
to allow the defense to call any
latent fingerprint expert who
indicates that fingerprints are not
reliable sources of information.
Only for that limited purpose
and I am going to exclude
evidence as to whether or not
[latent fingerprint identification
is] scientific, technical, or
whatever.  It has no relevance
before the jury here.  The question
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is whether or not an
identification can be made by
examination of
fingerprints—latent
fingerprints.
App. 1029a-1031a (repunctuated for
clarity).
As we understand the ruling, the
District Court held that the government’s
expert witnesses and Mitchell’s expert
witnesses could testify, but with the
caveat that the latter could not testify to
the question whether latent fingerprint
identification is a “science.”  This ruling
forms at least the baseline of two of
Mitchell’s issues on appeal: the
admission of government experts, and
the restriction of his own experts.  The
Court again discussed the admissibility
of the defense’s expert witnesses in a
colloquy with counsel immediately
before jury voir dire, an exchange that
we will discuss in greater detail, infra
Part IV.
Immediately following its ruling on
the admissibility of expert testimony, the
District Court addressed what would
become another ground of Mitchell’s
appeal.  Again from the bench, the Court
ruled:
This Court will take judicial
notice that human friction ridges
are unique and permanent
throughout the area of the friction
ridge skin, including small friction
ridge areas, and further that
human friction skin arrangements
are unique and permanent, and if
called upon, we will instruct the
jury as so.
App. 1031a (repunctuated for clarity). 
The Court so instructed the jury.  On
appeal, Mitchell asserts that it was error
for the District Court to take judicial
notice of these matters.
C.  Mitchell’s Second Trial
1. The Government’s Case
The case against Mitchell rested on
eleven lay witnesses and two experts. 
The government’s star witness was
Bookie’s girlfriend, Kim Chester.  Ms.
Chester testified that she was present
when Bookie and T were planning the
robbery, and that she helped Bookie
watch the comings and goings of the
armored car in the weeks before the
robbery.  Ms. Chester said that she and T
first met Mitchell and his wife at
Mitchell’s house, where she heard
Mitchell and T discussing plans for the
robbery.  Mitchell’s wife, Anita, invoked
her spousal privilege and did not testify. 
Eileen Lambert, T’s girlfriend at the
time, testified that she also witnessed
meetings between T and Mitchell.  
Ms. Chester testified that the night
before the robbery, Mitchell, Bookie, and
T discussed the need to obtain a stolen
car to use in the robbery.  She explained
that the next morning—September
12th—Bookie, T, and Mitchell drove her
to work.  She described how Mitchell
and Bookie were arguing about what car
to use in the robbery—the car they were
in was Mitchell’s wife’s car, and he did
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not want to use it in the robbery.  Ms.
Chester testified that they dropped her
off at her work, and that when she next
spoke to Bookie, he indicated that they
had gone through with the planned
robbery.  At that time, he had a
substantial amount of cash, some of
which he used to purchase a car and
redeem several pieces of jewelry from a
pawn shop.
Alma Shaw testified about her car
being stolen the morning of September
12th.  Emanuel Glover and Vernon
Muse, the armored car guards, and Kim
Kover-Jacobs, the check cashing agency
manager, testified about the robbery
itself.  Messrs. Glover and Muse both
identified Ms. Shaw’s car as the getaway
car; also, a fragment of the getaway car’s
license plate was noted by a bystander,
Regan Wiggins, and this fragment was
consistent with Ms. Shaw’s car’s license
plate.
Laura Barnett, a Philadelphia police
officer, testified that she recovered Ms.
Shaw’s car shortly after the robbery.  It
was found (with a bullet hole through the
trunk) a few blocks from the check
cashing agency.  FBI Special Agent
Donald Halfpenny testified that Ms.
Shaw’s car had been secured by the
Philadelphia police at the time he took
control of it.  Wilbur Johnson, an FBI
fingerprint examiner whom the Court
qualified as an expert, testified that in
Ms. Shaw’s car he found, photographed,
and preserved two latent
fingerprints—one from the gearshift
knob on the steering column, and one
from the driver’s side door handle—that
he later identified as matching Mitchell’s
ten-print card as the right and left
thumbs, respectively.
Mitchell was arrested the afternoon of
September 12th.  Special Agent Kevin
Mimm and Special Agent Daniel
Murphy, both of the FBI, testified to the
circumstances of the arrest.  They
explained how they had been conducting
surveillance operations in Philadelphia as
a result of a number of armored car
robberies; Agent Murphy was in charge
of these operations.  Agent Mimm
testified that while he was engaged in
covert surveillance of Mitchell and
tailing Mitchell’s car, Mitchell began to
flee; Mimm described how he chased
Mitchell at high speed for several blocks,
and was ultimately able to stop him.11 
Mitchell was arrested, and $1400 in five
and ten dollar bills was recovered from
him.  This currency was never identified,
however, as having been part of the
armored car delivery.
Agent Meagher returned to testify at
trial about many of the matters brought
out by the government at the Daubert
hearing.  He discussed the embryology of
friction ridge skin, the fingerprints of
identical twins, and the biological basis
    11The anonymous note that was the
subject of the previous appeal in this case
was the critical link: That note connected
the robbery getaway car to Mitchell’s
own car, allowing the FBI to monitor and
capture Mitchell so quickly.
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for the permanence of fingerprints.  He
described how latent prints are left and
how they are processed by examiners,
and the various conclusions that
examiners can draw from a comparison
of prints.  During Meagher’s testimony,
the government invoked the Court’s
promise to take judicial notice of the
uniqueness of small areas of friction
ridge skin.  The government also read a
stipulation detailing some of the results
of the survey that Meagher testified
about at the Daubert hearing, and the
prosecutor examined Meagher regarding
the agencies that did not make a positive
identification of the latent prints. 
Meagher then demonstrated to the jury in
some detail his use of the ACE-V
technique in matching the latent prints to
Mitchell’s ten-print card.  He stated
definitively that the fingerprints from the
beige car matched Mitchell’s ten-print
card.  Agent Johnson also stated
definitively that he had matched the
latent prints from the beige car to
Mitchell’s ten-print card, though he did
not give an in-depth demonstration to the
jury as Agent Meagher did.
2.  Mitchell’s Case and 
Cross-Examination of 
the Government’s Experts
The entirety of Mitchell’s case was
the testimony of individuals at state
agencies who examined or supervised the
examination of the latent prints sent by
Agent Meagher in the survey. 
Specifically, Mitchell called thirteen
latent fingerprint experts from nine
states, all of whom were initially unable
to identify one or both of the latent prints
as belonging to Mitchell.12
Mitchell also cross-examined the
government’s experts, Agents Johnson
and Meagher.  Cross-examination of
Johnson concentrated on questions about
his presentation to the jury of the
fingerprints he matched—Johnson’s
demonstrative exhibits identified only
nine points of Level 2 similarity between
the latent prints from the car and
Mitchell’s ten-print card, despite
Johnson’s and Meagher’s claims of a
greater number of similarities.  Through
cross-examining Agent Johnson,
Mitchell also probed the existence and
maintenance of minimum-point standards
and other quality-control measures at the
FBI in particular, and in the discipline
more generally.  Cross-examination of
Agent Meagher ranged into more general
considerations, most notably the limited
studies performed specifically to
establish an error rate for fingerprint
identification, and the limited means for
detecting errors in particular
examinations.  Meagher was also cross-
    12These witnesses (and their states)
were: John Otis (Maine); Janice
Williams and Michael McSparrin
(Mississippi); Ralph Turbyfill
(Arkansas); Donald Lock (Missouri);
Russell McNatt, Jr. (Delaware);
Raymond York (Idaho); John Artz
(Nevada); Janice Reeves (Louisiana);
and Richard Higgins, Edward Pelton,
Robert McAuley, and James Ruszas
(New York).
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examined on his highly suggestive
follow-up communications to those state
agencies that did not match Mitchell’s
prints in the survey.
D.  Withholding of the NIJ 
Solicitation and Mitchell’s 
Post-Trial Motion
On February 7, 2000, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. 
Mitchell’s May 15, 2000 motion for a
new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33
was founded on the discovery of a
research proposal solicitation released by
the National Institute of Justice (an arm
of the United States Department of
Justice) entitled Forensic Friction Ridge
(Fingerprint) Examination Validation
Studies (the “solicitation”).  The
solicitation sought proposals for research
studies on “validation of the basis for
friction ridge individualization and
standardization of comparison criteria.” 
App. 3078a.  Creation of the solicitation
had been underway before Mitchell’s
trial, but the solicitation was not released
until March 2000—after Mitchell’s trial
had concluded.
The District Court held a four-day
hearing to take testimony and receive
exhibits on the creation and import of the
solicitation.  At that hearing, Mitchell
established that Agent Meagher (as well
as some of the government’s other
witnesses at the Daubert hearing) had
been involved in drafting the solicitation. 
Prof. Starrs testified that he regarded the
solicitation as “a bolt out of the blue”
that suggested to him “that the sponsors
of the solicitation . . . admitted . . . [to]
serious shortcomings in fingerprinting as
it has been done up to this time.”  App.
2325a.
Moreover, Mitchell suggested that
even the government regarded the
solicitation as material.  His most
damaging evidence came from Dr.
Richard Rau of the NIJ, who coordinated
the drafting of the solicitation.  Rau
testified to conversations at a September
1999 meeting among himself, Donald
Kerr (the Assistant Director of the FBI in
charge of the FBI crime laboratory),
David Boyd (the Deputy Director of the
NIJ), and others.  Rau claimed that at that
meeting Kerr and Boyd agreed to
withhold release of the solicitation until
the end of Mitchell’s trial.  In response to
Dr. Rau’s testimony, the government
called Kerr, Boyd, and the other
individuals at the meeting to testify that
Dr. Rau’s account of the delay in
releasing the solicitation was incorrect
and that the delay was caused by
budgetary issues.
The District Court denied Mitchell’s
motion, reasoning that the solicitation
was not material for two independently
sufficient reasons: First, the solicitation
would not have been admissible at trial
because attacks on the reliability of latent
fingerprint identification were not
permitted at trial based on the Court’s
Daubert ruling; and second, the
solicitation was “not meant to set forth
the state of the current research” and so
its “claimed impeachment value . . .
either during the trial or for Daubert
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purposes is questionable at best.”  App.
12a-13a.  On appeal, the government
disclaims the first ground, but defends
the District Court’s ruling on the second
ground, as well as on alternative grounds
not reached by the District Court.
E.  This Appeal
The District Court had jurisdiction
over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
Mitchell filed a timely appeal from the
final judgment of conviction and
sentence, and we have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On appeal, Mitchell asserts that the
District Court committed five errors. 
First, he challenges the District Court’s
ruling following the Daubert hearing that
admitted the prosecution’s expert
testimony on fingerprint identification. 
Second, Mitchell claims that the District
Court erred in precluding his experts
from testifying at trial that fingerprint
identification is not a science, and is
otherwise unreliable.  Third, Mitchell
finds error in the District Court’s
decision to take judicial notice of the
uniqueness of small areas of friction
ridge skin.  Fourth, Mitchell contends
that the government’s withholding of the
NIJ solicitation, which could have been
used as impeachment evidence, merited a
new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, or
that this nondisclosure violated the
government’s obligation under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Fifth,
Mitchell asserts that the District Court
improperly admitted hearsay in the
testimony of the government’s principal
lay witness, Ms. Chester.  We will
address each of these contentions in turn.
III.  Admissibility of the 
Government’s Expert Testimony
A.  Standard of Review
The parties disagree about the
standard of review we should apply in
evaluating the District Court’s decision
to admit the government’s expert
testimony.  It is well-settled that, as a
general matter, we review a district
court’s decision to admit expert
testimony for abuse of discretion.  See In
re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir.
1999).  We exercise plenary review,
however, over a district court’s legal
interpretation of Fed. R. Evid. 702, under
which the evidence in question was
admitted.  See id.  On this much the
parties agree.
Disagreement arises about the
standard of review where, as here, the
District Court made no findings of fact to
support its admission of the testimony;
indeed, after the lengthy Daubert
hearing, the District Court elected not to
make findings of fact or conclusions of
law (written or oral), and simply ruled
from the bench.  This absence of factual
findings, Mitchell contends, requires
plenary review.  We reject the rule that
Mitchell urges for four reasons.  First,
Mitchell has provided no precedent for
such a heightened standard of review
over a field historically committed to the
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sound discretion of district courts.13 
Second, the exception that Mitchell
proposes would swallow the rule that
district courts’ evidentiary rulings are
generally reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.  The vast majority of
evidentiary rulings are made on-the-fly
and without written findings of fact, yet
this Court routinely affords deference to
such judgments.  Third, Mitchell’s
argument misconceives the rationale for
using a deferential standard of review. 
Deferential review is employed not
because the court being reviewed labored
to produce a long opinion—there are
lengthy but incorrect opinions just as
there are brief but sagacious ones. 
Rather, deferential review is used when
the matter under review was decided by
someone who is thought to have a better
vantage point than we on the Court of
Appeals to assess the matter.  See
Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial
Process 728-29 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion
of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above,
22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 663 (1971)
(“[P]robably the most pointed and
helpful [reason] for bestowing discretion
on the trial judge is [that] . . . . he sees
more and senses more [than the Court of
Appeals].”)).  This case is a good
example: The District Court assessed
extensive live testimony, while we work
from a cold record.  Fourth, the Supreme
Court has in other contexts rejected
heightened appellate review of district
court rulings on expert testimony.  See
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997).
Thus we reject Mitchell’s proposed
standard of review, and adhere to the
usual precepts of abuse-of-discretion
review over the District Court’s decision
to admit the government’s expert
testimony.
B.  Standard for Admissibility 
under Rule 702
The pathmarking Supreme Court
cases interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 702 are
Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  The
version of Rule 702 in effect at the time
of the Daubert hearing and the trial
    13The case Mitchell cites in his brief
and relied on at oral argument, United
States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 927 (4th
Cir. 1997), is inapposite.  Ellis applied
plenary review not to the admission of
expert testimony, but rather to a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct where the
district court had made no findings of
fact.  Apart from the fact that the issue in
Ellis has strong Constitutional overtones
that the Rule 702 issue in this case lacks,
this Court does not agree with the Fourth
Circuit on this point.  See United States
v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d 153, 163 (3d Cir.
1987) (reviewing District Court’s
rejection of a prosecutorial misconduct
claim for abuse of discretion).
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provided:14
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.
Daubert identified the twin concerns
of “reliability” (also described as “good
grounds”) and “helpfulness” (also
described as “fit” or “relevance”) as the
“requirements embodied in Rule 702.”15 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-92.  Daubert
was “limited to the scientific context
because that [wa]s the nature of the
expertise offered [t]here,” id. at 590 n.8,
but Kumho Tire extended Daubert’s
“general principles” to all of “the expert
matters described in Rule 702.”  Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 149.  Thus “technical
knowledge,” under which heading the
discipline of latent fingerprint
examination and identification seems to
fall, is generally subject to the same
considerations as “scientific” expertise.
The “general principles” adverted to
in Kumho Tire comprised not only the
fundamental concerns of reliability and
helpfulness, but also a method for
assessing reliability.  The Daubert Court
articulated “general observations” to this
end by offering a nonexclusive list of
five factors that a district court might
consider in deciding whether to admit
evidence under Rule 702.  The Advisory
Committee summarized these factors:
The specific factors explicated by
the Daubert Court are (1) whether
the expert’s technique or theory
can be or has been tested—that is,
whether the expert’s theory can be
challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is instead
simply a subjective, conclusory
approach that cannot reasonably
be assessed for reliability; (2)
whether the technique or theory
    14The rule was subsequently amended,
effective December 1, 2000, to codify
aspects of Daubert and its progeny.  The
Advisory Committee’s note
accompanying that amendment is a
useful consolidation of commentary and
precedent on the version of Rule 702 that
applies in Mitchell’s case, and so we will
refer to it at points in our opinion.
    15In applying the teachings of Daubert
in In re TMI Litigation, we explained that
Rule 702 was addressed to two issues:
first, the qualification of the experts
themselves, and second, the reliability
and helpfulness of their testimony.  See
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 664 (citing
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 749-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (Paoli II)). 
Daubert addresses the latter.  As noted
above, the former is not at issue in this
appeal, as the District Court qualified all
experts on both sides in their proffered
areas of expertise, and neither party
challenges any of these rulings.
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has been subject to peer
review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of
error of the technique or
theory when applied; (4) the
existence and maintenance of
standards and controls; and (5)
whether the technique or
theory has been generally
accepted in the scientific
community. 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s
note.
Citing Kumho Tire, the Advisory
Committee noted that “[o]ther factors
may also be relevant,” id., and indeed,
courts have augmented this list.  In Paoli
II we drew on Daubert and our earlier
decision in United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), to lay out
an expanded list of factors:
(1) whether a method consists of a
testable hypothesis; (2) whether
the method has been subject to
peer review; (3) the known or
potential rate of error; (4) the
existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the
technique’s operation; (5) whether
the method is generally accepted;
(6) the relationship of the
technique to methods which have
been established to be reliable; (7)
the qualifications of the expert
witness testifying based on the
methodology; and (8) the
non-judicial uses to which the
method has been put.
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8.
These factors address only reliability,
and not “helpfulness” or “fit.”  But the fit
inquiry in the case of fingerprint
identification is not a significant factor,
because identity evidence is the
archetypal relevant evidence in criminal
cases.  Thus, the analysis that follows
only addresses the reliability prong of
Daubert.
C.  Application of Daubert Factors 
to Government’s Expert Testimony
1.  Testability
We first consider whether the
premises on which fingerprint
identification relies are testable—or,
better yet, actually tested.  “Testability”
has also been described as
“falsifiability.”  See, e.g., Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593 (citing Karl R. Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations: The
Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th
ed. 1989)).  A proposition is “falsifiable”
if it is “capable of being proved false;
defeasible.”  Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 820
(unabridged ed. 1966).  Proving a
statement false typically requires
demonstrating a counterexample
empirically—for instance, the hypothesis
“all crows are black” is falsifiable
(because an albino crow could be found
tomorrow), but a clairvoyant’s statement
that he receives messages from dead
relatives is not (because there is no way
for the departed to deny this).
In this case, the relevant premises
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were posed as explicit questions to many
of the government experts: (1) Are
human friction ridge arrangements
unique and permanent? and (2) Can a
positive identification be made from
fingerprints containing sufficient
quantity and quality of detail?  The
government’s experts responded in the
affirmative.  We must consider not
whether we agree as a factual matter with
their responses, see Paoli II, 35 F.3d at
744, but rather whether these hypotheses
are testable (or tested).  We conclude that
they are.
Consider the first premise (which is
really two hypotheses in one)—that
human friction ridge arrangements are
unique and permanent.  The uniqueness
proposition is testable because it would
immediately be shown false upon the
production of identical friction ridge
arrangements taken from different
fingers (either from different fingers on
the same person, or from two different
people).  The uniqueness proposition has
also been tested in several ways: First,
the full-print matching portion of the
FBI’s 50/50 experiment tested it and
found no true matches.16  Second, studies
on identical twins (testified about by
Agent German) showed unique
fingerprints.  While this is a small
sample, there are independent and solid
genetic grounds for believing that if
identical friction ridge arrangements are
to be found, they are most likely to be
found in identical twins.  Third, in the
course of routine fingerprint
examination, there are certainly
opportunities to encounter identical
fingerprints; as several witnesses
testified, such a discovery would be very
notable and word would spread quickly
throughout the fingerprint examiner
community.  Yet no reports of non-
unique friction ridge arrangements were
introduced, and, indeed, the FBI survey
sent to state agencies revealed that none
had ever encountered two different
persons with the same fingerprint.  Joint
Supp. App. at 55.
The permanence component of the
first hypothesis is also easily
testable—simply take fingerprints from
an individual at one time and compare
them to the prints taken at another time. 
The Daubert hearing did not provide
much evidence of actual testing of this
    16The experiment had its limitations,
though.  First, the test sought to match
fingerprints, not friction skin
arrangements on actual fingers.  Second,
it was only a sample—50 thousand
fingers tested, out of about 60 billion in
the world.  While this sample size seems
quite large, and doubtless would be
adequate in many if not most
circumstances, we are unsure if it is
adequate here.  There is limited evidence
on the record of why the government’s
experts chose a 50 thousand fingerprint
set, and why they could confidently
extrapolate from it.  Indeed, there is
some suggestion that purely practical
technical concerns may have dominated
this choice.  See infra note 18.
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hypothesis, however.
We turn next to the testability of the
second hypothesis—that  positive
identification can be made from
fingerprints containing sufficient
quantity and quality of detail.  Much of
the debate in this case is masked by the
word “sufficient.”  For example, a
sufficiency standard of “100 points of
matching Level 2 detail in an undistorted
fingerprint lifted from a clean, smooth
surface” would surely attract less
objection than a sufficiency standard of
“four points of matching Level 2 detail
and passable quality.”  The actual
standard employed by any given FBI
examiner falls somewhere between these
extremes, yet the FBI’s reliance on an
unspecified, subjective, sliding-scale mix
of “quantity and quality of detail” makes
meaningful testing elusive, for it is
difficult to design an experiment to test a
hypothesis with unspecified parameters. 
Two things rescue fingerprint
identification from this apparent failure
of testability: First, the examiner can
testify to how much detail (quantitative
and qualitative) was necessary for the
particular identification at issue; and
second, any testing directed toward
falsifying the premise that a greater or
equal amount of detail is sufficient to
make an identification will serve as an
attempt (albeit an imperfect one) to
falsify the adequacy of the identification
standard actually used.17
Just how much testing has been done
to this end is unclear from the testimony
at the Daubert hearing.  On the one hand,
it might be that examiners compare a
latent print to a series of full-rolled prints
until a match is found, and then terminate
the process.  If this protocol is used for
routine examinations, those examinations
will not tend to turn up multiple matches,
because the examiner stops work after
finding one match.  In essence, the
    17A concrete example may provide
some clarity.  In this case, Agent
Meagher identified fourteen points of
Level 2 detail (and unspecified
supporting Level 3 detail, which we
leave aside for simplicity) that matched
Mitchell’s right thumbprint to the latent
print taken from the gearshift knob. 
Thus, for purposes of this particular
identification, “sufficient quantity and
quality of detail” really means “fourteen
points of Level 2 detail.”  The hypothesis
that “fourteen points of Level 2 detail is
enough to make an identification” is
falsifiable because one might be able to
show that some latent print matches more
than one full-rolled print under the
“fourteen points of Level 2 detail”
standard.
Actual testing (as opposed to mere
testability) is harder to come by, probably
because someone seeking to falsify this
hypothesis has no a priori reason to
choose 14 points instead of 13 or 15 as
the standard.  Nonetheless, any showing
that a more stringent standard (e.g., a 20-
point standard) is fallible necessarily
implies that the 14-point standard is also
fallible.
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examiner has assumed the
conclusion—that no other prints will
match the latent, and therefore no further
search is required.  On the other hand,
testimony at the Daubert hearing about
the AFIS computer system suggests that
the system tests a given latent print
against its entire database (or a selected
subset) of full-rolled prints, and returns a
set of the best candidate matches.  This
protocol would tend to expose multiple
full-rolled prints that match a given
latent.  Consequently, a lack of multiple
matches from AFIS searches can
constitute testing of the hypothesis that
single positive identifications can be
made from latent fingerprints.  Whatever
the case, no state agency claimed in
response to the FBI survey that it had
found a latent fingerprint that was
“identified with two different fingers of
the same person or even different
persons.”  Joint Supp. App. at 55.  This is
perhaps the strongest support for the
government on this point.
Modest support also comes from the
second part of the government’s 50/50
experiment, which matched simulated
latent prints (pseudolatents) against the
50,000 full-rolled prints in the sample
under examination.  Setting aside
spurious results due to mistakes in the
FBI’s database, the experiment found
that each pseudolatent strongly matched
one and only one full-rolled print.  In
other words, the experiment did not
reveal any counterexample to the
hypothesis that identifications can be
made.  Moreover, statistical
computations extrapolating this to a
much larger population of prints
suggested that such duplicate matches
would still be highly improbable.
Mitchell’s experts, however, attacked
the design of the 50/50 experiment, most
effectively on the ground that
pseudolatents are poor approximations of
real latent prints.18  This lack of
correspondence undermines the utility of
the experiment because the issue for
Daubert purposes is the testing of the
hypothesis that positive identification be
made from actual latent fingerprints
containing sufficient detail.  As we
recount above, see supra page 13,
Mitchell’s experts (particularly Dr.
Stoney) convincingly explained why the
    18They also contended that actual tests
on a larger data set (i.e., more
fingerprints) would have been preferable
to statistical extrapolations.  However,
significantly larger data sets may be
computationally intractable:   The
experiments conducted for this case took
on the order of a day to run on the
computer.  But for larger sets of
fingerprints, the number of comparisons
goes up as the second power (i.e., the
square) of the number of prints in the
sample.  Thus, a 1 million / 1 million
experiment would take 20 x 20 = 400
times longer than a 50 thousand / 50
thousand experiment—or on the order of
a year to complete, given the same
computing power.  An experiment with
the FBI’s full AFIS database would take
millennia.
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process used by the government experts
to generate the pseudolatents for the
50/50 experiment renders them poor
substitutes for actual latent prints.  In
brief, the failing flagged by Dr. Stoney is
that actual prints are subject to
distortions and artifacts that were not
simulated by the pseudolatent generator. 
Arguably, the pseudolatents resembled
actual latents only in that the former were
similar in areal size to the latter.  Dr.
Stoney’s contention rings true: Distorted,
real-world latent prints should tend to be
harder to match to full-rolled prints than
should computer-generated simulated
latents.  Since the 50/50 experiment did
not adequately model real-world
conditions, we cannot say that it
significantly supports the government’s
position.
In sum, if directed, specific actual
testing were the requirement of Daubert,
we might be hesitant to find this factor
weighing in favor of the government. 
There is some force to Budowle’s point
that “[n]o one would say any one test or
any kind of thing [that] has been done in
one hundred years proves uniqueness.” 
App. 1013a.  But his further point about
a long history of implicit testing is
equally forceful: “It’s the culmination of
all of the experiences that [demonstrate
uniqueness].”  App. 1013a.  Moreover,
testability—which assures the opponent
of proffered evidence the possibility of
meaningful cross-examination (should he
or someone else undertake the
testing)—is one of the factors announced
by the Daubert Court as an indicium of
reliability.  In sum, the hypotheses that
undergird the discipline of fingerprint
identification are testable, if only to a
lesser extent actually tested by
experience, and so we find this factor to
weigh in favor of admitting the evidence.
2.  Peer Review
The evidence at the Daubert hearing
on peer review was not particularly
extensive.  Much of the testimony
centered around the question whether the
“verification” step in the ACE-V
protocol—where a second examiner
confirms the identification made by the
first examiner—constitutes effective peer
review.  On the one hand, this could be
viewed as stringent peer review,
equivalent to the best sort used in, for
example, the physical sciences, where
peer review most often consists of
anonymously reviewing a given
experimenter’s methods, data, and
conclusions on paper.  Sometimes the
review takes the form of reproducing in
full the results under review—that is, a
second investigator repeats the entire
course of experiments.  Thus the
verification step of ACE-V seems
usually to be akin to this heightened form
of peer review: The government’s
experts testified that verification often
amounts to repeating the whole
identification process de novo, though
sometimes the verifying examiner will
merely confirm the match found by the
initial examiner.  See App. 161a. 
Moreover, in this particular case, the
survey of state law enforcement agencies
constitutes verification many times over
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of the match of Mitchell’s fingerprints.
Mitchell’s experts, however, (Dr.
Cole in particular) cast some doubt on
the purity of the verification step. 
Backed by his research, Dr. Cole
suggested that fingerprint examiners
have developed an “occupational norm
of unanimity” that strongly discourages
the verifying examiner from challenging
the identification made by the initial
examiner.  Moreover, Dr. Cole criticized
peer review of latent fingerprint
identification conclusions for not being
anonymous.  We also acknowledge that
the cultural mystique attached to
fingerprint identification may infect the
peer review process.  But the
government’s experts countered that they
were aware of cases where the results of
the verification step caused the initial
examiner to withdraw his initial
identification.  Looking at the entire
picture, the ACE-V verification step may
not be peer review in its best form, but,
on balance, the peer review factor does
favor admission.
The peer review factor also
encompasses publication, as the
dissemination of a work tends to subject
it to scrutiny in the same way that
prepublication peer review does.  See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.  On the one
hand, a significant fraction of the
publications in the field concern articles
on technique—for example, the best
practices for preserving latent
prints—and such materials say little
about the field’s reliability.  On the other
hand, there are articles—introduced both
by the government and by Mitchell—that
address more theoretical/foundational
questions, such as an appropriate
minimum point standard, the likelihood
of two persons having identical friction
ridge arrangements, and so on.  Thus the
publication facet of peer review is not a
strong factor, and neither reinforces nor
detracts from our conclusion that the peer
review factor favors admission.
3.  Error Rate
The parties have waged a
considerable battle of experts over
whether a known error rate exists for
latent fingerprint identification. 
Assuming that such a rate has been
soundly established, it is surely a low rate
of error.  But the existence of any error
rate at all seems strongly disputed by
some latent fingerprint examiners.
The question whether an error rate
can be established on the existing data is
subtler than the parties seem to
acknowledge.  Preliminarily, we must
distinguish between two error rates: false
positives and false negatives.  In this
context, false positives are incorrect
affirmative identifications, and false
negatives are incorrect findings of
dissimilarity.  A fair amount of the
government’s evidence—and also much
of Mitchell’s response—centers on the
existence vel non of failed
identifications.  For example, the
government stresses the large number of
state agencies that confirmed its
identifications, and Mitchell counters by
pointing to the agencies that failed to
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identify the prints.  But these
observations go to the rate of false
negatives: While a system of
identification with a high false negative
rate may be unsatisfactory as a matter of
law enforcement policy, in the courtroom
the rate of false negatives is immaterial
to the Daubert admissibility of latent
fingerprint identification offered to prove
positive identification because it is not
probative of the reliability of the
testimony for the purpose for which it is
offered (i.e., for its ability to effect a
positive identification).19
Thus we must focus on evidence that
is probative of the rate of false positives. 
Perhaps the government’s most powerful
evidence is the fact that, in the course of
the FBI survey of state agencies, no
jurisdiction ever matched the latent prints
from the gearshift knob and door handle
to anyone other than Mitchell
himself—despite searches run against (in
the aggregate) nearly 70 million ten-print
records.  Assuming that every record had
10 fingerprints, and that the latents
actually were left by Mitchell, the test of
the two latent prints against these records
implies something on the order of 1.4
billion comparisons resulting in no false
positives.  The government can also draw
support from the very limited number of
reports of false positive identifications
throughout the many decades that the
technique has been in use.  Furthermore,
the government’s 50/50 experiment using
pseudolatents, representing 2.5 billion
comparisons, also did not register any
false positives, though as we have noted,
see supra page 27, it had flaws.
Mitchell counters this evidence in
two different ways, but neither of them
fully refutes the government’s evidence. 
First, he raises a legal challenge,
claiming that the burden of proof under
Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) is up-ended by
effectively requiring him to come
forward with examples of false positives. 
While Mitchell is correct that Rule
104(a) places the burden of proof on the
proponent of the evidence (here, the
    19Moreover, evidence of the false
negative rate is often equivocal.  While it
might suggest a generally error-prone
method, it is equally consistent with a
very conservative method with a low
false positive error rate.  That is, a
method may be designed to lower its
false positive error rate by accepting a
large number of false negatives out of an
abundance of caution.  One very familiar
example of such a system is the criminal
jury using the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard: As the adage (attributed
to Blackstone) says, “It is better that ten
guilty escape [false negatives] than one
innocent suffer [a false positive].”  The
same may be true for latent fingerprint
identification—the examiners who
declared they could not match the latent
prints in the FBI’s survey (the examiners
responsible for the putative false
negatives) may have done so because
they would rather commit a likely false
negative error rather than risk a small chance of a false positive identification.
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government), see Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987), this
does not mean that the burden is static, at
least in terms of a burden of going
forward.  Particularly in a case like this,
where what is sought to be proved is
essentially a negative (i.e., the absence of
false positives), it seems quite
appropriate to us to use a burden-shifting
framework.  Such a framework was
applied here: The government’s
experts—qualified as knowledgeable in
matters pertaining to fingerprint
identification—testified to their being
unaware of significant false positive
identifications.  At that point, it becomes
quite reasonable to shift the burden to the
opponent of the evidence (here, Mitchell)
to counter this claim with affirmative
examples.
Mitchell’s second attack on the
government’s evidence of error rates is
factual.  He presented evidence that
fingerprint examiners sometimes make
false positive identifications on
proficiency examinations.  This evidence
is troubling, but we view it as evidence
relating only to the competency of those
practitioners, leaving undisturbed the
government’s evidence about the near-
absence of false positive identifications.20
We therefore accept that the error rate
has been sufficiently identified to count
this factor as strongly favoring admission
of the evidence.  The error rate has not
been precisely quantified, but the various
methods of estimating the error rate all
suggest that it is very low.  This follows
from three pieces of evidence we identify
above as favoring the government: (1)
    20Mitchell’s experts respond by
denying the existence of a dichotomy
between method error rate and
practitioner error rate, asserting that both
are part of a unitary inquiry.  We reject
this view as a legal conclusion
inconsistent with Paoli II.  Paoli II
makes clear that error rates and the
qualification of the expert are distinct
inquiries.  35 F.3d at 742.  The corollary
to this, however, raises an issue for any
given fingerprint expert: His testimony
would be more likely to be admitted
(because he would be more qualified) if
he himself demonstrated a low rate of
false positives in his own work and/or on
his own proficiency tests.  Cf. Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., 350 F.3d 316, 322
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the scope of
an expert’s testimony was properly
circumscribed by the scope of his
expertise).
As suggested above, known false
positives have been attributed to malice
or incompetence on the part of the
examiner, and not to a deeper flaw in the
method itself.  Dr. Cole testified that this
“circling the wagons” behavior is yet
another occupational norm of a
fingerprint identification community bent
on preserving the unimpeachability of its
methods.  But even if every false positive
identification signified a problem with
the identification method itself (i.e.,
independent of the examiner), the overall
error rate still appears to be microscopic.
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the absence of significant numbers of
false positives in practice (despite the
enormous incentive to discover them),
(2) the absence of false positives in the
FBI’s state agency survey, and (3) the
statistical computations based on the
50/50 experiment.
4.  Maintenance of Standards
Closely related to the question of
error rate is the maintenance of standards
to guide the application of the method. 
This is lacking here in some measure. 
The FBI maintains that its flexibility to
consider a mixture of Level 2 and Level
3 detail in making identifications renders
its method superior to and more flexible
than the minimum-points standards used
in some states and various foreign
jurisdictions.  The tradeoff, though, is
that the FBI’s method lacks a significant
yardstick of standard-based objectivity. 
In contrast, with a minimum-point
standard there is at least some agreement
about what constitutes a Galton point and
what does not.
Some standards do remain: There are
procedural standards (such as ACE-V)
and terminological standards (such as the
naming conventions for Galton points).  
But these are insubstantial in comparison
to the elaborate and exhaustively refined
standards found in many scientific and
technical disciplines.  As such, we find
that this factor does not favor admitting
the evidence.
5.  General Acceptance
Prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, admission of expert
testimony was governed by the Frye test,
which required that the evidence must
have gained “general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.” 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923).  Daubert held that
Congress’s adoption of Rule 702
legislatively overruled Frye, see 509 U.S.
at 588-89, but at the same time
acknowledged that “‘general acceptance’
can yet have a bearing on the inquiry,”
id. at 594.  Thus we consider as one
factor in the Daubert analysis whether
fingerprint identification is generally
accepted within the forensic
identification community.  The answer is
yes, as demonstrated by the results of the
FBI’s survey of state agencies.  See  App.
383a.  Mitchell’s only argument with
respect to this factor is that there is no
scientific community that generally
accepts fingerprint identification.  But
the scientific/nonscientific distinction is
irrelevant after Kumho Tire, and
accordingly we reject the argument.  We
also note that the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, in addressing the
same question that we are considering
here, relied heavily on general
acceptance to support the admission of
fingerprint identification evidence.  See
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th
Cir. 2003).  We likewise conclude that
this factor weighs in favor of admitting
the evidence.
6.  Relationship to Established 
Reliable Techniques
Although the parties have not
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provided us with extensive analysis of
the relationship of the principles and
practice of latent fingerprint
identification to “‘more established
modes of . . . analysis,’” Paoli II, 35 F.3d
at 742 (quoting Downing, 753 F.2d at
1238-39), it seems to us that this is the
best heading under which to consider the
government’s evidence from the fields of
developmental embryology and anatomy. 
The testimony and documentary
materials introduced on these topics
during the Daubert hearing—especially
through Dr. Babler—tended to establish
biological bases for the uniqueness and
permanence of areas of friction ridge
skin.  Since no question was raised about
the soundness and reliability of the work
in these specialties, we are comfortable
that the reliability of these fields is well-
established.  Independent work in these
fields bolsters the underlying premises of
fingerprint identification, and so we find
that this factor lends additional support
to admitting the latent fingerprint
identification evidence.
7.  Degree to Which the Expert
Testifying Is Qualified
As we have noted before, there were
essentially no challenges to the
qualifications of the government’s
experts (or of Mitchell’s experts, for that
matter), but the binary question whether
an expert is or is not qualified to testify
to a particular subject is analytically
distinct, under Rule 702, from the more
finely textured question whether a given
expert’s qualifications enhance the
reliability of his testimony.  See
Schneider ex rel. Estate of Schneider v.
Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“[The defendant’s] argument appears to
challenge the qualification of [the
plaintiff’s expert]; although we note that
‘the degree to which the expert testifying
is qualified’ also implicates the reliability
of the testimony.” (quoting Paoli II, 35
F.3d at 742)).
The qualifications of Agents Meagher
and Johnson matter the most, because
they were the government’s experts at
trial.  Both had estimable qualifications. 
The putative blemish on their
qualifications, which we hint at above,
see supra note 20, is that neither testified
extensively about his own known error
rate as a practitioner (as might be
revealed, for example, by proficiency
tests they had taken).  While this is by no
means fatal to the admissibility of the
testimony, prosecutors would be well-
advised to elicit testimony about their
experts’ personal proficiency, rather than
relying on the discipline’s good general
reputation among lay jurors.  Failing that,
we are confident that defense counsel
will use cross-examination to expose
incompetent fingerprint examiners.  In
this case, Agent Meagher’s uniquely
strong qualifications and the
confirmatory identifications from state
agencies are a surrogate for testimony
about Agent Meagher’s and Agent
Johnson’s personal proficiency as
examiners.21  Thus this factor supports
    21Mitchell’s counsel came close to
inquiring on voir dire about Agent
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admitting the government’s evidence.
8.  Non-Judicial Uses
We have recognized that evidence of
the non-judicial uses of the technique in
question is relevant to the Daubert
reliability inquiry.  See Paoli II, 35 F.3d
at 742.  This is because non-judicial use
of a technique can imply that third
parties—i.e., persons other than the
proponent of the expert testimony, for
whom the testimony is typically self-
serving—would vouch for the reliability
of the expert’s methods.22  The
government offered some evidence of the
non-judicial uses of fingerprint
identification, particularly through Dr.
Budowle.  App. 639a-641a.  In analyzing
this factor, the government relies on
three categories of non-judicial uses of
fingerprints: (1) the identification of
arrested persons (e.g., checking an
arrestee’s record at the time of booking);
(2) biometric identification as a security
measure (e.g., authenticated access to a
computer system) or for regulatory
purposes (e.g., fingerprinting for driver
licensing as an anticounterfeiting
measure); and (3) identification of partial
remains following disasters.  While at
first blush this seems like a factor
strongly supporting admissibility, the
bloom recedes upon close analysis.
Latent fingerprint identification
works from fingerprints that are partial
and subject to distortions.  All the non-
judicial uses listed above either use full-
Meagher’s results on proficiency
examinations administered internally by
the FBI, but did not actually ask a
specific question.  App. 1456a-1457a. 
The government did ask Agent Johnson
about his results on FBI proficiency
examinations, but defense counsel
objected and the Court sustained the
objection on the ground that Johnson had
already been qualified as an expert.  App.
1652a-1653a.  As our discussion in the
text suggests, this question was
proper—even desirable—and the District
Court was wrong to sustain the objection.
    22Keeping this rationale in mind is
helpful, because some non-judicial uses
will support the required inference of
third-party confidence better than others. 
For example, no one would argue that the
commercial popularity of astrology for
non-judicial use makes it fit for
admission under Rule 702.  This case
may provide another example: As we
discuss below, the government
introduced evidence of the widespread
commercial use of biometric
identification technology based on
fingerprints.  It is possible that
commercial adoption of the method
signals acceptance of its reliability.  But,
as Mitchell’s uncontradicted survey
evidence showed, fingerprint
identification enjoys a near-mythical
reputation for reliability, and so the
evidence of commercial adoption is
equally consistent with uncritical
acceptance of a method that consumers
merely believe—but do not know—to be
reliable.
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rolled prints, or avoid the difficulties
introduced by distortion—or both.  Both
differences are critical, as Mitchell’s
experts testified and as the government’s
experts acknowledged: It is significantly
easier to match one clean full-rolled print
to another than it is to match a somewhat
distorted latent fragment to a full-rolled
print.23  Thus, in the case of identification
of arrestees, the booking officer will take
a ten-print card with a full set of full-
rolled prints, and if the prints do not
come out cleanly, the officer has the
opportunity to take a second set of
impressions.  Likewise, the security and
regulatory uses of fingerprinting
generally rely on clean, full-rolled
prints.24  As for disaster-victim
identification, the government’s experts
did testify that fragments of friction ridge
skin have been used to make
identifications, but even those
identifications still differ from latent
fingerprint identification because
identification using actual skin eliminates
the challenges introduced by
distortions.25  Thus there is less here than
meets the eye, and while this factor
supports admitting the government’s
evidence, it does so only weakly.
D.  Application to the Record of 
Core Daubert Principles
Although it is clear from the
foregoing analysis of the Daubert factors
    23The government’s experts implicitly
acknowledged this—even before the
Daubert hearing—in the very design of
the 50/50 experiment: The first stage of
that experiment was the matching of full-
rolled prints to full-rolled prints, but the
ultimate aim of the experiment was to
test pseudolatent prints against full-rolled
prints to better simulate the more
demanding exercise of latent fingerprint
identification.  Of course, as we have
noted above, see supra page 14, even this
refined experiment used pseudolatents,
and thus failed to capture the
complexities of matching latent prints
marred by distortions and artifacts.
    24Dr. Budowle testified that current
commercial research and development
seeks to use as little as 6% of the area of
the full print to make an identification. 
App. 639a.  This makes such a technique
more akin to latent fingerprint
identification, but it still differs in
significant ways.  First, the fraction of
the print will be distortion-free, unlike
actual latent prints.  Second, the 6%
portion is likely to be taken from a
portion of the finger with a high areal
density of Level 2 detail, a luxury that
latent fingerprint examiners do not have.
    25We also understand the task in
disaster-victim identification as being
(merely) to individualize one victim out
of at most a few thousand victims, while
forensic criminal identification seeks to
individualize the defendant out of a pool
of millions of potential perpetrators. 
Accordingly, there seems to be less of a
threat of a false positive in the context of
disaster-victim identification than in
forensic criminal identification.
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that the government’s fingerprint
evidence passes muster, Mitchell
contends that the government’s inability
to establish that its evidence is correct,
and its failure to show that its evidence
meets the standards required of
“science,” mean that the government’s
evidence must be excluded.  Mitchell is
wrong.  This is established by Daubert
itself, which requires no more than that
the Court satisfy itself that “good
grounds” exist for the expert’s opinion. 
See 509 U.S. at 590.
Judge Selya has put it well:
Daubert does not require that a
party who proffers expert
testimony carry the burden of
proving to the judge that the
expert’s assessment of the
situation is correct.  As long as an
expert’s scientific testimony rests
upon “good grounds, based on
what is known,” it should be
tested by the adversary
process—competing expert
testimony and active cross-
examination—rather than
excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for
fear that they will not grasp its
complexities or satisfactorily
weigh its inadequacies.  In short,
Daubert neither requires nor
empowers trial courts to
determine which of several
competing scientific theories has
the best provenance.  It demands
only that the proponent of the
evidence show that the expert’s
conclusion has been arrived at in a
scientifically sound and
methodologically reliable fashion.
Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,
161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at
590) (citing Kannankeril v. Terminix
Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir.
1997); Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 744), quoted
in part in In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d
at 692.  Good grounds for admission
plainly exist here.
To the extent that Mitchell’s attack
rests on his experts’ claim that latent
fingerprint examiners do not engage in
“science,” he does not heed the text of
Rule 702 or the Supreme Court’s
teachings in Kumho Tire.  Rule 702
“makes no relevant distinction between
‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or
‘other specialized’ knowledge.”  Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 147.  The very holding
of Kumho Tire is that those categories
simply address what type of testimony is
covered by the rule, and that, in
addressing admissibility under Rule 702,
the same factors generally apply to all
categories of expert testimony.  Kumho
Tire explicitly rejected as unworkable
and unnecessary any “distinction
between ‘scientific’ knowledge and
‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’
knowledge.”  Id at 148.  That a particular
discipline is or is not “scientific” tells a
court little about whether conclusions
from that discipline are admissible under
Rule 702; at best, there will be some
overlap between the factors that bear on
a field’s status as “science” and
Daubert’s factors addressed to reliability. 
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Reliability remains the polestar.
Mitchell seeks a significantly higher
threshold of admissibility under Rule
702, and, consequently, a very different
allocation of responsibility between
judge and jury.  Yet Rule 702 and
Daubert put their faith in an adversary
system designed to expose flawed
expertise.  Mitchell misconceives this
balance struck by the framers of Rule
702 and the Daubert Court.  As the
Advisory Committee explained in the
context of the December 1, 2000
amendment to Rule 702, “Daubert did
not work a ‘seachange over federal
evidence law,’ and ‘the trial court’s role
as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as
a replacement for the adversary system.’”
Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s
note (quoting United States v. 14.38
Acres of Land Situated in Leflore
County, Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th
Cir. 1996)).  Daubert itself emphasized
the point:  “Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means
of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.”  509 U.S. at 596.  These trial
practices and procedural devices like the
directed verdict, “rather than wholesale
exclusion under an uncompromising . . .
test, are the appropriate safeguards where
the basis of scientific testimony meets
the standards of Rule 702.”  Id.  We
echoed this in Paoli II, where we noted
“Rule 702 mandates a policy of liberal
admissibility.”  35 F.3d at 741.
In this context, the court is often
referred to as a “gatekeeper.”  This
metaphor is particularly apt because it
works two ways: On the one hand, the
court must exclude some evidence as a
gatekeeper, by “preventing opinion
testimony that does not meet the
requirements of qualification, reliability
and fit from reaching the jury,”
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404.  But on the
other hand, the court is only a
gatekeeper, and a gatekeeper alone does
not protect the castle; as we have
explained, “[a] party confronted with an
adverse expert witness who has
sufficient, though perhaps not
overwhelming, facts and assumptions as
the basis for his opinion can highlight
those weaknesses through effective
cross-examination.”  Stecyk v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408,
414 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Indeed, as our discussion of the
various Daubert factors suggests, many
of them are guarantees that cross-
examination and adversary testing will be
possible: Testability ensures the basic
possibility of meaningful cross-
examination.  Peer review and
publication also provide raw material for
the cross-examining attorney to confront
the expert with.  The existence of a
known error rate may force an expert to
admit to the limitations of his or her
methods.  The maintenance of standards
provides an objective benchmark to
confirm that the expert did indeed follow
her method.  And so on.  Since these
factors were well-satisfied in this case, it
was with confidence that the baton was
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passed from the Court to the adversary
system.
The principle that cross-examination
and counter-experts play a central role in
the Rule 702 regime has three important
applications to this case.  First is the core
holding of United States v. Velasquez, 64
F.3d 844, 848-49 (3d Cir. 1995): Experts
with diametrically opposed opinions may
nonetheless both have good grounds for
their views, and a district court may not
make winners and losers through its
choice of which side’s experts to admit,
when all experts are qualified.  Rather,
the same standards of reliability and
helpfulness should be applied to both
sides, with a “‘preference for admitting
any evidence having some potential for
assisting the trier of fact.’” Id. at 849
(quoting DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
We return to this in the next section,
where we discuss the District Court’s
handling of Mitchell’s experts.
Second, district courts will generally
act within their discretion in excluding
testimony of recalcitrant expert
witnesses—those who will not discuss on
cross-examination things like error rates
or the relative subjectivity or objectivity
of their methods.  Testimony at the
Daubert hearing indicated that some
latent fingerprint examiners insist that
there is no error rate associated with their
activities or that the examination process
is irreducibly subjective.  This would be
out-of-place under Rule 702.  But we do
not detect this sort of stonewalling on the
record before us.
Third, this case does not announce a
categorical rule that latent fingerprint
identification evidence is admissible in
this Circuit, though we trust that the
foregoing discussion provides strong
guidance.  And as we explain in
Velasquez, both Rule 702 and the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
permit any criminal defendant to put the
prosecution to its proof at trial.  None of
this, however, should be read to require
extensive Daubert hearings in every case
involving latent fingerprint evidence. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that
district courts “have the same kind of
latitude in deciding how to test an
expert’s reliability” as they do in
deciding “whether or not that expert’s
relevant testimony is reliable.”  Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.  Thus a district
court would not abuse its discretion by
limiting, in a proper case, the scope of a
Daubert hearing to novel challenges to
the admissibility of latent fingerprint
identification evidence—or even
dispensing with the hearing altogether if
no novel challenge was raised.
E.  Conclusion on the Admissibility 
of the Government’s Evidence
We conclude, on the record before us
read in light of the basic Daubert
principles, that most factors support (or
at least do not disfavor) admitting the
government’s latent fingerprint
identification evidence.  There are good
grounds for its admission.  We therefore
conclude that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in holding the
government’s evidence admissible.
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IV.  Admissibility of Mitchell’s 
Expert Testimony
A.  Introduction
Mitchell asserts that he was not
permitted to put on all of his experts at
trial, and hence was not able to
effectively counter or undermine the
government’s fingerprint identification
evidence.  Specifically, Mitchell
contends that his three principal experts
at the Daubert hearing—Dr. Stoney,
Prof. Starrs, and Dr. Cole—were, as a
practical matter, excluded from the trial
by the District Court’s rulings limiting
the scope of their testimony.  Mitchell
argues that our holding in United States
v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995),
requires that he be able to present
qualified expert testimony before the jury
to challenge the government’s expert
testimony.  The government does not
dispute this as a legal matter; instead it
takes issue with Mitchell’s premise,
arguing that the District Court did not in
fact exclude Mitchell’s witnesses.  The
foregoing discussion about the central
role of adversary testing in expert
testimony has direct application.
If Mitchell were correct that his
experts—who were undoubtedly
qualified to offer their expert
opinions—were precluded from
testifying in opposition to the
government’s experts, our holding in
Velasquez would obligate us to vacate
Mitchell’s conviction and remand for a
new trial at which their testimony would
be heard.  But our review of the record
does not disclose that Mitchell’s experts
were excluded or the scope of their
testimony improperly limited.  To the
extent that the record is even ambiguous,
the onus was on Mitchell’s counsel to
make a clear record, especially given the
multiple, nuanced categories of
testimony being discussed in the
colloquies with the District Court on this
matter.
As in the previous section, we review
the District Court’s decision to admit or
exclude expert testimony for abuse of
discretion, see In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d
at 666, but also note that an error of
law—such as a failure to follow
Velasquez—is an abuse of discretion, see
Planned Parenthood v. Attorney Gen.,
297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002).  We
begin with a discussion of Velasquez and
then turn to the District Court’s rulings.
B.  Velasquez
The defendant in Velasquez was tried
on federal drug, firearms, and conspiracy
charges.  A fact in issue at trial was the
origin of certain packages with
handwritten mailing labels, packages the
government sought to connect to
Velasquez’s coconspirators.  The
government proposed to make the
connection by way of forensic
handwriting identification, and the
District Court qualified an analyst from
the Postal Inspection Service to testify to
the handwriting identification.  In
response, Velasquez proffered his own
expert—a law professor critical of
handwriting analysis whose research, we
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held, qualified him as an expert in
handwriting analysis—to testify that
handwriting analysis in general is not
reliable, and, in the alternative, that the
particular identifications made by the
government’s expert were unreliable. 
The District Court declined to admit
Velasquez’s expert’s testimony,
reasoning that “whether or not
handwriting expertise is admissible in a
courtroom is a legal question that was
resolved against the defense when the
court permitted [the government’s
expert] to testify as a qualified expert in
the field of handwriting analysis.” 
Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 846-47 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, we reversed.  The central
error in the District Court’s reasoning
was its failure to follow the “axiom” that
“the reliability of evidence goes ‘more to
the weight than to the admissibility of the
evidence.’” Id. at 848 (quoting United
States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d
Cir. 1992)).  Following that principle, the
substantive reliability question is as
much for the jury (in the context of
courtroom adversary testing) as it is for
the court (in the context of a Daubert
hearing).  Consequently, we held that it
was an error of law to fail to admit the
testimony of a qualified opposing expert,
provided that the testimony meets the
usual criteria for admission under Rule
702.  Moreover, in situations covered by
Velasquez, the opposing expert’s
testimony will ordinarily be helpful to the
jury precisely because it is opposing—it
will help the jury to evaluate the
reliability of the opinion offered by the
proponent expert.  See Velasquez, 64
F.3d at 852 (holding that Velasquez’s
expert “would have assisted the jury in
determining the proper weight to accord
[the government’s expert’s] testimony”).
In sum, Velasquez announces a parity
principle: If one side can offer expert
testimony, the other side may offer
expert testimony on the same subject to
undermine it, subject, as always, to
offering a qualified expert with good
grounds to support his criticism.  Having
this in mind, we turn to what happened in
Mitchell’s case.
C.  The Parties’ Interpretations of 
the District Court’s Rulings
The District Court addressed the
scope of Mitchell’s proposed trial
experts’ testimony on two occasions
before trial: first at the time it ruled on
the admissibility of the government’s
expert testimony (the “first colloquy”),
and again immediately prior to jury voir
dire (the “second colloquy”).  Because
our discussion may be illuminated for
some readers by a transcript of these
colloquies, we rescribe the relevant
passages in the Appendix.
In brief, the government claims that
the District Court simply precluded
Mitchell’s experts from testifying to the
(irrelevant, it argues) issue of whether or
not latent fingerprint identification is a
science; all other testimony by Mitchell’s
experts regarding the reliability of the
discipline, the government says, was
ruled admissible by the District Court. 
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Mitchell, however, submits that the
District Court expressly precluded two of
his witnesses (Prof. Starrs and Dr. Cole)
from testifying at trial, and severely (and
impermissibly, he submits) restricted the
scope of the testimony of his third expert
(Dr. Stoney).  To support these positions,
both parties offer interpretations of the
colloquies with the District Court.
The government advances a three-tier
theory of the rulings of the Court on
defense expert testimony, supported
principally by the following statement by
the District Court during the first
colloquy:
I am not going to limit the defense
from calling latent fingerprint
experts to testify as to the ability
not to identify or make an
identification from the
fingerprints and I am also going to
allow the defense to call any latent
fingerprint expert who indicates
that fingerprints are not reliable
sources of identification.
Only for that limited purpose
and I am going to exclude
evidence as to whether or not it’s
scientific, technical or whatever. 
It has no relevance before this jury
here.  The question is whether or
not an identification can be made
by examination of
fingerprints—latent
fingerprints—and the record of
this case, as far as the
Daubert hearing will remain intact
with these proceedings and will
go with it through the life of this
case.
App. 1030a-1031a.
The government interprets the three
tiers as follows: First, the defense could
challenge the specific identifications
made of Mitchell’s prints.  (Something
like this was actually done—Mitchell put
on the fingerprint examiners who
responded to the FBI survey and who
initially did not match the latent prints
found in the car to his fingerprints.) 
Second, the defense could challenge the
reliability of latent fingerprint
identification in general, by arguing, for
example, that the discipline lacked an
error rate, and thus the government
expert witnesses’ testimony was
unreliable.  (This, the government
recognizes, is compelled by Velasquez.) 
Third, the defense could not put on
witnesses to speak to the essentially
definitional question of whether latent
fingerprint identification was a science.
 The government primarily directs our
attention to four points in the colloquies. 
First is the passage quoted above from
the beginning of the first colloquy,
before counsel for either side had even
spoken.  Second, moving to the second
colloquy (nearly five months later), the
Court arguably suggested a more blanket
exclusion of defense testimony, but the
government counters that the written
record of the colloquy is misleading
because the whole topic of discussion
had caught the Court by surprise and the
Court’s recollection needed to be
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refreshed.  (Indeed, for much of the
colloquy, the Court did not even have a
transcript of the prior ruling before it.) 
Third, the government points out that
during the second colloquy, the
prosecutor advanced his own recollection
of the ruling, saying that, in addition to
permitting the defense to call experts that
would testify that the fingerprints in this
case did not match Mitchell’s, “[the
Court] also said [to the defense] that they
can call any qualified expert . . . that
would testify that fingerprints are not
reliable sources of identification.”  App.
1071a.  The government emphasizes that
this was consistent with the three-tier
theory.
Fourth, the government reads the
ultimate ruling at the end of the second
colloquy—especially the Court’s
approval of defense expert testimony by
experts addressing “Mr. Mitchell’s
fingerprints or anyone else’s
fingerprints,” App. 1072a—as a
reaffirmance of the three-tier ruling. 
This should have special significance
because it was the Court’s last word on
the subject.  Finally, looking beyond the
colloquies, further circumstantial support
for the prosecution’s three-tier theory can
be drawn from the District Court’s ruling
at trial that Mitchell was allowed to
cross-examine Agent Meagher on several
issues pertaining to the general reliability
of latent fingerprint identification.  See
App. 1543a.
For his part, Mitchell first directs our
attention to the first colloquy where the
Court seemed to make a specific ruling
against admitting testimony by experts
other than Dr. Stoney.  There, the Court
said, “the only one that appears close [to
admissible] . . . would be Dr. David A.
Stoney.”26  App. 1032a.  Second,
Mitchell points to the Court’s statement
near the end of the first colloquy that “I
am not getting into the issue of latents in
general.  That’s been established,” App.
1033a, contending that this runs directly
    26Mitchell bolsters this contention by
pointing to a press release issued by the
United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on the day of the
first colloquy.  With respect to Mitchell’s
proposed experts, the press release
stated:
The Court granted the
government’s request to exclude
the testimony of the defendant’s
experts James E. Starrs, a
Professor at George Washington
University Law School, David A.
Stoney, Ph. D. of the McCrone
Research Institute, Chicago, and
Simon A. Cole, Ph.D.  Those
witnesses testified that fingerprint
evidence and comparisons are not
scientific evidence under Daubert.
2d Supp. App. 1a.  The government
counters that this is consistent with its
three-tier theory because the release
characterizes the ruling as precluding
Mitchell’s experts from testifying about
whether latent fingerprint identification
is scientific.  Whatever the case, we note
that such press releases do not strike us
as reflecting good practice.
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counter to our holding in Velasquez. 
Third, Mitchell disagrees with the
government’s claim that some of the
second colloquy was colored by the need
to refresh the Court regarding the issue;
Mitchell would have us take the Court’s
statements literally—for example a “yes”
from the Court following a statement by
defense counsel that Mitchell had been
“precluded from introducing [testimony]
that the fingerprint field is of
questionable reliability,” App. 1067a, as
evincing agreement rather than as a
signal to “go on.”  Fourth, Mitchell does
not read the Court’s ultimate ruling at the
end of the second colloquy to be a
blanket authorization to put on any
reliability-related expert testimony, but
rather a very limited approval of
testimony assailing any government
testimony that relied on a particular
point-based standard for identification. 
This interpretation seems consistent with
Mitchell’s counsel’s contemporaneous
representation that they had no witness
that would meet the Court’s
requirement.27
D.  Discussion
We begin our analysis with the point
on which the parties are in agreement:
The District Court excluded expert
testimony on the subject of whether
latent fingerprint identification is a
science.  We hold that it was correct to
do so.  Kumho Tire renders the question
of “is it science?” immaterial to the
    27Mitchell also contends that his
reading of the District Court’s rulings is
correct because of statements made by
the District Court as part of its ruling on
Mitchell’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for
a new trial.  In that order, the District
Court explained that, based on its earlier
rulings, the NIJ solicitation would not
have been admissible because:
[W]e excluded any evidence at
trial as to whether or not
fingerprint identification
technology is reliable pursuant to
the Daubert/Kumho standards. 
We clarified that the only issue for
the experts to discuss at the
Mitchell trial was whether or not
an identification could be made by
examination of the specific latent
fingerprints and the record of this
case.
App. 5a.
We decline to rely on these
statements and accept the government’s
submission that the District Court’s
statements in its post-trial order are not
entitled to weight.  The Court was
looking back at oral rulings that were
over a year old, and made its ruling
following a trial at which Mitchell had
not, in fact, put on experts to opine that
fingerprint identification was not a
reliable discipline.  And at all events,
when the question is (as here) whether a
party has preserved the record for appeal,
the salient issue is not what the District
Court thought it had ruled, but what the
state of the record before us is.  Thus the
post-trial ruling is irrelevant to our
discussion.
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jury’s determination (and the court’s, for
that matter, see supra page 36). 
Consequently, such testimony will not
“assist the trier of fact . . . to determine a
fact in issue,” making the testimony not
admissible under Rule 702.  Since the
evidence is opinion testimony, there is no
other appropriate basis on which to admit
it, and so the District Court was correct
to exclude it.
On balance we agree with the
government that the District Court
consistently operated on a three-tier
theory of what expert testimony was
admissible—allowing specific criticisms
and general reliability criticisms, but
excluding testimony about whether latent
fingerprint identification is a “science.” 
At the same time, we acknowledge the
force of Mitchell’s reading.  But even if
Mitchell’s reading were correct, he
would not prevail because the record
does not establish an affirmative
exclusion of testimony that should have
been admitted under Velasquez.  Counsel
simply did not seek rulings on the
admissibility of proposed expert
testimony, and instead simply discussed
admissibility in terms of proposed expert
witnesses.  From these rulings, we cannot
say that the District Court erred.
To elaborate, both Mitchell and the
District Court framed the issue as
whether a given witness was or was not
admissible, and not as whether testimony
on a given subject matter was admissible. 
While this approach may seem
pragmatic—after all, from a logistical
point of view, what matters is whether a
given witness will or will not testify—it
has serious pitfalls for creating an
appellate record.  If an expert witness is
excluded, it is generally because he or
she is unqualified; but this is irrelevant
here because the parties do not dispute
the qualifications of the witnesses.  To be
sure, expert witnesses may also as a
practical matter be excluded because
they cannot testify to any admissible
subject matter.  But in such a case, the
legally operative question is “what is
(are) the proposed subject matter(s) of
the witness’s testimony?”   This is
necessarily so because the only way for
appellate courts to state the law for future
cases is to do so in terms regarding the
subject matter of proposed testimony—as
we did in Velasquez, for example.  Thus
speaking in terms of which witness is
admissible is actually one step removed
from the legally operative question. 
Using witnesses as shorthand for subject
matters may be convenient, but it
becomes confusing and the law becomes
difficult to apply, especially when a
given witness testifies on multiple
subject matters.
This is precisely what happened here:
All of the principal defense experts
testified in some measure on whether
fingerprint identification was a
“science.”  This, we have already held
above, was properly excluded.  Those
same experts also testified to the
reliability (or lack thereof) of fingerprint
identification.  That evidence, under
Velasquez, would have been
unambiguously admissible.  Yet the
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admissibility question was not, as best
we can divine from the colloquies,
framed in this way.
At the Daubert hearing, Mitchell’s
counsel cast his case as an assault on the
scientific status of fingerprint
identification.  Indeed, at the Daubert
hearing, Dr. Stoney was offered as “an
expert with respect to scientific status or
lack thereof with respect to latent
fingerprint identification,” App. 761a;
Prof. Starrs was offered as “an exert [sic]
in forensic science qualified to provide
an opinion as to whether latent
fingerprint examination meets the criteria
of science,” App. 813a-814a; and Dr.
Cole was offered as “an expert in the
field of science and technology studies
with particular expertise regarding the
fingerprint profession,” App. 939a.  At
no point thereafter did Mitchell attempt
to have these witnesses qualified
differently.
Mitchell’s attorneys hewed to this
rubric even after the hearing, and so
interpreted the District Court’s (proper)
exclusion of “is it science?” testimony as
a wholesale exclusion of their witnesses. 
They were not required to approach the
matter in this way, and the District Court
was surely not required to disabuse
Mitchell’s counsel of this notion. 
Mitchell could have asked the Court
whether Prof. Starrs and Dr. Cole would
be permitted to testify as to the reliability
of fingerprint identification, provided
that they did not opine on the irrelevant
issue of whether it was science.  Instead,
he accepted their exclusion.  Mitchell
could have proffered the subject matter
of testimony he would like to present. 
Instead, he proffered the witnesses he
would like to call.  Mitchell could have
attempted to put his witnesses on the
stand to preserve his objections.  Instead,
they never appeared at trial.
At best, Mitchell offers a modest
circumstantial case that, if he had posed
the question of the admissibility of
defense expert testimony that fingerprint
identification is unreliable, the District
Court would have excluded it, contrary to
Velasquez.  But if the question was never
asked—and our review of the record
suggests it was not—then it is hardly
grounds for reversal that the District
Court might have ruled incorrectly.  Thus
the District Court committed no error.
V.  The District Court’s Declaration 
of Judicial Notice
We next turn to the question whether
the District Court properly took judicial
notice that “human friction ridges are
unique and permanent throughout the
area of the friction ridge skin, including
small friction ridge areas, and that . . .
human friction skin arrangements are
unique and permanent.”  App. 1472a. 
“[A] court’s decision whether to take
judicial notice of certain facts is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  In re
NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314,
1323 (3d Cir. 2002).
A.  Appropriateness of Judicial Notice
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)
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specifies what matters are the proper
subject of judicial notice:28
A judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.
The actual phrasing offered by the
government and adopted by the District
Court is opaque; while we can
comprehend the notion that friction ridge
arrangements are permanent, we are
unsure what it means to describe
“arrangements,” considered in the
abstract, as “unique.”  On one level, this
seems irrelevant: Since the issue at trial
was latent fingerprints, it is difficult to
see how general propositions about
“arrangements” are related to any “fact
that is of consequence to the
determination of the action,” Fed. R.
Evid. 401.  Moreover, “small friction
ridge areas” seems problematic—what is
“small”?  (In light of the issues at trial,
we imagine that it was a reference to
areas the size of typical latent
fingerprints.)  Even without reference to
the substantive standard in Rule 201(b),
we wonder whether the very phrasing of
the judicially noticed material signals
that the District Court erred.
Vagueness and irrelevance aside,
judicial notice of these matters clearly
failed Rule 201(b).  The Rule requires
that the matter “not [be] subject to
reasonable dispute.”  Yet much of
Mitchell’s presentation at the Daubert
hearing was directed at disputing this
very proposition;29 if the question
merited such an extensive Daubert
hearing, it surely was not suitable for
resolution by judicial notice.  Moreover,
Rule 201 speaks in terms of “fact[s].” 
Here, the Court took judicial notice of a
scientific conclusion—something which
is subject to revision—not a “fact.”30 
One of the purposes of a Daubert hearing
    28Rule 201 also provides that a party
be “heard as to the propriety of taking
judicial notice,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(e);
Mitchell was heard in the course of the
Daubert hearing.  Further, the Rule
requires that “[i]n a criminal case, the
court shall instruct the jury that it may,
but is not required to, accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed,”
Fed. R. Evid. 201(g), a caveat that the
Court included in the jury instructions.
    29One of Mitchell’s own experts, Dr.
Stoney, did agree, however, that small
areas of friction ridge skin are unique.
    30The distinction implied by Rule
201(b)’s use of “fact” can be made
clearer by the use of more polarized
examples: Matters like “February 7, 1977
was a Monday” (a fact) are suitable for
judicial notice, while propositions like
“daily exercise reduces the likelihood of
heart disease” (a scientific conclusion)
are not.
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is to educate the Court as to the relevant
expertise.  That the Daubert hearing
consumed five days before the Court
could take judicial notice only further
compels the conclusion that this “fact”
was neither “generally known” nor
“capable of . . . ready determination.”
The government’s defense of the
District Court’s taking of judicial notice
focuses on the large number of cases
where courts have taken judicial notice
of the uniqueness of fingerprints.  None
of the cases cited by the government is
binding on this Court.  More to the point,
none of them concern judicial notice of
the uniqueness and permanence of “small
areas” of friction ridge skin—rather, the
cases generally concern the uniqueness
of full fingerprints, or the method of
fingerprint identification.  While we have
doubts about the propriety of taking
judicial notice even in those cases (one
need only look at our Daubert analysis
above to see that the matter is in dispute),
for present purposes we need only note
that the cases cited by the government
are clearly distinguishable.  Thus we
conclude that it was error for the Court to
take judicial notice as it did.
B.  Harmless Error Analysis
Having concluded that it was error
for the District Court to take judicial
notice as it did, we must consider
whether the error was harmless.  Under
our precedent, an error is harmless if “‘it
is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the judgment.’” United
States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 255 (3d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Murray v. United of
Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 156
(3d Cir. 1998)).  We conclude that the
error was harmless.
The record of the Daubert hearing
establishes that the government could
have adduced estimable testimony—both
in its quantity and quality—in place of
the District Court’s taking judicial notice. 
The ready availability of probative,
credible substitute evidence suggests
with a high probability that the jury’s
verdict would not have changed had the
District Court declined to take judicial
notice and the government been forced to
put on live testimony.  The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
endorsed the view that the availability of
cumulative or substitute evidence can
make admission of evidence harmless.
See United States v. Arroyo, 805 F.2d
589 (5th Cir. 1986); cf. United States v.
Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that improper admission
of cumulative evidence is generally
harmless error).  We also note that
Mitchell was free to put on evidence to
rebut the substance of the Court’s
judicial notice, see Gov’t of V.I. v.
Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 147 n.17 (3d Cir.
1975), but did not do so.
We recognize the possibility that the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause may be implicated when a court
undertakes a harmless error analysis in a
criminal case—such as we are doing
here—and bases its conclusions on the
probable outcome of a hypothetical trial
where hypothetical witnesses are called. 
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See United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d
156, 164-65 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1999).  This
would not present an obstacle here,
however, because the putative substitute
testimony was actually given at the
Daubert hearing and was subject there to
cross-examination by Mitchell, who had
the same motive to attack the
government’s experts as he would have
had at trial.  Thus the Confrontation
Clause would not, at all events, be
offended by our harmless error analysis. 
See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
1354, 1374 (2004) (“Where testimonial
evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common
law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”); cf.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (permitting
introduction of hearsay under these
conditions).
Mitchell counters that the District
Court’s declaration of judicial notice lent
an imprimatur of authority to the
government’s fingerprint case that no
amount of expert testimony could have
replaced, and no amount of rebuttal
could have overcome.  We acknowledge
that the consequences of a district court’s
taking judicial notice of disputed facts
can be considerable, for the unique
imprimatur of the district court can
render judicial notice of a disputed fact
not harmless, even when there is
cumulative (or substitute) evidence.  But
we do not think the facts here support
that argument, principally because the
government had not only substitute
evidence, but almost overwhelming
substitute evidence: The Daubert hearing
record discloses a wealth of testimony on
this point from credible and well-
qualified experts.  In fact, at the Daubert
hearing the government asked each of
five distinguished expert witnesses his
opinion of essentially the matters the
District Court judicially noticed.  All five
took the same position as the District
Court did in taking judicial notice.  See
supra page 8.  Thus, this was not a case
where judicial notice replaced limited
and shaky evidence.  Any additional
authority the government drew by the
Court’s taking judicial notice was, at
most, marginal.  Thus we conclude that,
though error, the District Court’s taking
of judicial notice was harmless.
VI.  Withholding of the NIJ Solicitation
Mitchell argued in his Fed. R. Crim.
P. 33 motion that the government
violated its obligations under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing
to disclose the solicitation for fingerprint
validation studies which it ultimately
released to the public shortly after
Mitchell was convicted.  Several prongs
must be met to establish a Brady
violation, but we need only concern
ourselves—as the District Court
did—with Brady’s materiality prong. 
We agree with the District Court that,
even if Mitchell had had the solicitation
at trial, there was not a reasonable
probability that he would have been
acquitted.
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A.  Standard of Review and 
Applicable Law
We have explained that “[o]rdinarily
we review a district court’s ruling on a
motion for new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence for abuse of
discretion.”  United States v. Perdomo,
929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing
Gov’t of V.I. v. Lima, 774 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir. 1985)).  But “[b]ecause a Brady
claim presents questions of law as well
as questions of fact, we will conduct a de
novo review of the district court’s
conclusions of law as well as a ‘clearly
erroneous’ review of any findings of fact
where appropriate.”  Id. (citing Carter v.
Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1306 (3d Cir.
1987)).
In Brady, the Supreme Court
announced that “‘the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution.’” Banks v. Dretke,
124 S. Ct. 1256, 1267 (2004) (quoting
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).  “[T]he three
components or essential elements of a
Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim,”
the Court recently reiterated, are: “‘The
evidence at issue must be favorable to
the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;
that evidence must have been suppressed
by the State, either willfully or
inadvertantly; and prejudice must have
ensued.’”  Id. at 1272 (quoting Strickler
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
In evaluating a Brady claim, the
“touchstone on materiality is Kyles v
Whitley.”  Id. at 1276.  “[T]he materiality
standard for Brady claims is met when
‘the favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict.’” Id. (quoting
Kyles, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  This a
defendant must show by demonstrating a
“‘reasonable probability’ of a different
result,” had the withheld evidence been
available.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (citing
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
678 (1985)).  This standard is relatively
lenient; “[t]he question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not
have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence.”  Id.
Two other questions of law bear on
the somewhat unusual circumstances of
the alleged Brady violation in this case. 
First, assuming that the government
acted in bad faith to withhold publication
of the solicitation, we must consider
how, if at all, the bad faith aspect affects
the Brady calculus.  We are deeply
discomforted by Mitchell’s
contention—supported by Dr. Rau’s
account of events, though contradicted
by other witnesses—that a conspiracy
within the Department of Justice
intentionally delayed the release of the
solicitation until after Mitchell’s jury
reached a verdict.  Dr. Rau’s story, if
true, would be a damning indictment of
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the ethics of those involved.
The District Court declined to reach
the issue of whether the government
suppressed the solicitation, and it made
neither a finding of fact nor even an
implicit credibility determination on the
conflict between Dr. Rau’s account and
the testimony of the government’s
witnesses.  Thus we have no factual
determination to which we may defer. 
But as a legal matter, the question of
good faith versus bad faith is a
distinction without a difference in the
Brady context.  Indeed, the Brady Court
itself said that its holding was
“irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution,” 373 U.S. at 87,
and this was reaffirmed in United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1972) (“If
the suppression of evidence results in
constitutional error, it is because of the
character of the evidence, not the
character of the prosecutor.”).  Mitchell
does not suggest, nor do we adopt, a rule
of per se materiality in the face of bad
faith withholding by the prosecution.
Mitchell does, however, urge us to
adopt the position enunciated in United
States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305 (7th
Cir. 1986).  There the Court of Appeals
explained that the existence of bad faith
on the part of the prosecution is
probative of materiality because it is
“doubtful that any prosecutor would in
bad faith act to suppress evidence unless
he or she believed it could affect the
outcome of the trial.”  Id. at 1311 n.4. 
We agree that the existence of bad faith
on the part of the prosecution is a factor
for the court to consider in weighing the
materiality of the withheld evidence. 
The District Court erred to the extent that
it undertook its Brady materiality inquiry
without evaluating and incorporating the
government’s alleged bad faith.  In the
next section we will consider the alleged
bad faith in making our own materiality
determination.
The second question of law that we
must address arises because the
government proffered extensive evidence
to rebut Mitchell’s contentions regarding
the solicitation.  Therefore we must
determine whether we are to assess
Brady materiality by reference to a
hypothetical trial at which the withheld
evidence alone is introduced, or one at
which both the withheld evidence and
reasonable rebuttal evidence are
introduced.  The Supreme Court has
made clear that the Brady (or, in its
citations, Bagley) materiality
determination displaces a harmless error
inquiry.  See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435-36. 
Thus, assuming that the Confrontation
Clause bears on this issue, see supra
page 47, its significance is the same.
In deference to the possible
Confrontation Clause implications,
absent an opportunity for cross-
examination of prosecution rebuttal
evidence (which would satisfy
Crawford), we will undertake the Brady
materiality inquiry with reference only to
the evidence withheld, and not consider
the prosecution’s rebuttal.  We note,
however, that the typical case will be the
exception to this rule: Normally a Brady
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claim will be assessed in light of an
evidentiary hearing—as was the case
here—and the defendant will have an
opportunity for cross-examination at that
hearing.  Such cross-examination
satisfies Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374,
and thus would clearly be properly
considered in evaluating Brady’s
materiality prong.  Since Mitchell had the
opportunity for cross-examination in his
new trial hearing, we will consider the
full record in determining whether there
is a reasonable probability that the
solicitation would have changed the
outcome of the trial.
B.  Discussion
The first Brady prong (“favorable to
the accused”) is met, for the parties do
not dispute that the existence of the
solicitation is favorable to Mitchell
(though just how favorable it is is very
much in dispute).  We do not reach the
question whether the second prong
(“suppressed by the State”)—which we
have held requires that the prosecution
have “actual knowledge or cause to
know” of the undisclosed material, see
United States v. Veksler, 62 F.3d 544,
550 (3d Cir. 1995)—is met by virtue of
either (1) the involvement of government
experts in the solicitation’s preparation,
or (2) the fact that the NIJ and the United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania are both under the United
States Department of Justice.  Therefore,
we confine our discussion to the third
prong (“prejudice must have ensued”).
As we have noted, the District Court
gave two reasons why the solicitation
was not material under Brady: first, that
it would not have been admissible, and
second, that even had it been admitted,
there was not a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have
changed.  On appeal, the government
does not defend the District Court’s first
ground; the parties correctly recognize
that under Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, the
solicitation would have been admissible
both at trial and at the Daubert hearing as
tending to undermine the government’s
claim that latent fingerprint identification
is reliable.
Mitchell principally presses on appeal
that use of the solicitation at the trial
itself would have had a reasonable
probability of changing the verdict, but
we will first consider whether the
solicitation was material to the Daubert
ruling, since a Daubert ruling favorable
to Mitchell would very likely have
changed the outcome at trial.  Based on
our thorough review of the admissibility
under Daubert of the government’s latent
fingerprint identification evidence, see
supra Part III, it is clear that the Daubert
calculus does not materially change in
light of the solicitation.
Mitchell’s main contention requires
that we consider whether the absence of
the solicitation at trial “undermine[s]
confidence in the verdict.”  Kyles, 514
U.S. at 435.  We assume, but do not
decide, that the solicitation would have
been admissible at trial for its contents as
a non-hearsay admission of a party
opponent (the government) under Fed. R.
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Evid. 801(d)(2), and would have been
admissible as impeachment evidence
under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) against
Agent Meagher, who participated in the
preparation of the solicitation.
Mitchell hypothesizes that “[t]he jury
most probably would have been stunned
to learn . . . that the government and its
fingerprint experts have ‘invited’. . .
‘basic research’ to determine whether
fingerprints are truly unique and testing
to determine whether fingerprint
examiners can produce correct results
with acceptable error rates.”  Reply Br. at
39.  If the solicitation were to be taken in
a vacuum, this might be true.  But the
government witnesses at the new trial
hearing explained—and the District
Court found as a factual matter—that this
solicitation (like other NIJ solicitations)
is not “meant to set forth the state of the
current research, but rather is only
intended to set forth sufficient
information such that researchers can
apply for funds to perform further
research.”  App. 12a.  Apart from direct
testimony from several government
witnesses familiar with the NIJ
solicitation process, there was also
evidence that the NIJ routinely issues
solicitations for research in other well-
established fields of forensic expertise,
such as DNA identification.  Thus the
District Court’s finding regarding the
purpose of the solicitation is not clearly
erroneous.  In that light, we conclude that
a reasonable jury would not conclude
that the solicitation was the smoking gun
that Mitchell makes it out to be.
The government’s bad faith, if any, in
withholding the solicitation does not
appreciably alter this because intentional
withholding in these circumstances is
consistent not only with a guilty mind but
also with a concern on the government’s
part that the solicitation would be
misunderstood.  Moreover, the
solicitation would have been only a small
part of a large mosaic of evidence put on
at trial about the reliability and operation
of latent fingerprint identification.  In our
view, the impact of the solicitation would
have been dwarfed by other evidence
favorable to the government.
Relatedly, Mitchell contends that the
solicitation would have been powerful
impeachment evidence against Agent
Meagher, who was the government’s
principal expert witness at trial, because
Meagher was involved in the drafting of
the solicitation.  In ruling on Mitchell’s
Rule 33 motion, the District Court
credited “the testimony of the
Government’s witnesses at the
Solicitation Hearing that the Solicitation
does not change their testimony
regarding fingerprint technology.”  App.
12a-13a.  In other words, the District
Court discounted the impeachment value
of the solicitation even after having seen
Mitchell’s actual cross-examination of
the government’s experts both with the
solicitation (at the new trial hearing) and
without it (at trial).  The District Court
had the best vantage point, at both
proceedings, to assess the government’s
witnesses (especially Agent Meagher),
and we defer to its finding.  See United
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States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318 (3d Cir.
2002).
In sum, the solicitation does not
undermine our confidence in the verdict
from a substantive or impeachment
vantage point.  We conclude that it was
not material, and therefore reject
Mitchell’s Brady claim.
VII.  Admission of Alleged 
Prior Consistent Statements
Mitchell’s final objection is to what
he regards as the admission of certain
prior consistent statements by the
government’s key lay witness, Kim
Chester.  Mitchell contends that,
following his attack on Chester’s
credibility during cross-examination, the
government on redirect sought to
rehabilitate her by introducing prior
consistent statements.  Mitchell’s
argument is that the District Court erred
in letting the prosecution proceed as it
did because those statements were
hearsay not within any hearsay
exception.  We conclude that, in fact, no
hearsay was introduced, and therefore
Mitchell’s objection fails.
Although counsel for Mitchell
objected at pertinent points during the
redirect examination of Chester on
various specific grounds, no hearsay
objection was made.  Thus Mitchell has
failed to preserve this objection for
appeal.  See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1);
United States v. Sandini, 803 F.2d 123,
126 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that specific
objections are required to preserve issues
for appeal); United States v. Gomez-
Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that a party fails to
preserve an issue for appeal by making
an incorrect specific objection).
Accordingly, our review is for plain
error only.  See United States v. Brink, 39
F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1994).  To
establish plain error, a defendant must
prove that there is “(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is
‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affects substantial
rights.’  If all three conditions are met, an
appellate court may then exercise its
discretion to notice a forfeited error, but
only if (4) the error ‘seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.’”  Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)
(citations omitted).
The government’s redirect
examination of Ms. Chester elicited three
things.  First, she had met with FBI
agents and given them a statement. 
Second, that statement included
discussions of Mitchell, Bookie, and T’s
activities.  Third, she had testified before
regarding their activities.  (This
testimony was in Mitchell’s first trial,
though the jury, of course, did not learn
this.)  The examination did not establish
the contents of those prior statements,
merely their existence and subject matter. 
The prosecution used the existence of
these prior statements during closing
arguments to bolster Chester’s credibility
with a “dog that did not bark” argument. 
That is, the prosecutor offered the jury
the line of reasoning that if these
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statements existed, and they were
harmful to Ms. Chester’s credibility, then
Mitchell surely would have introduced
them.  The fact that he did not, the
prosecutor argued, must mean that they
were not inconsistent, and that Ms.
Chester was in fact a reliable and
consistent witness.31
Mitchell claims that the government
introduced Chester’s prior consistent
statements (to the FBI and at Mitchell’s
first trial) to rehabilitate her in the wake
of attacks on her credibility during cross-
examination.  While the government’s
motive was to rehabilitate Ms. Chester,
we do not agree that any hearsay
statements were introduced.  Rule
801(c), which defines “hearsay,”
concerns only “statements,” and so the
first question to ask is whether the
government elicited a statement.
“A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by
the person as an assertion.”  Fed. R.
Evid. 801(a).  Nonverbal conduct is
plainly not at issue.  Chester’s prior
statements may be oral or written
assertions, but they were not actually
introduced.  Testimony about the
existence of a statement is not itself a
“statement.”  Furthermore, to the extent
that Chester testified that certain matters
were discussed on prior occasions, that
testimony was not “offered . . . to prove
the truth of the matter asserted,” Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c), and thus not inadmissible
under Rule 802.32  Thus the District
    31The relevant portion from the
prosecutor’s closing argument was:
Indeed, you heard, [Ms.
Chester] had testified in a prior
proceeding.  Did you hear counsel
take the notes from that and say,
well, isn’t it true you said
something different before?  No. 
I suggest to you that the reason
was because she didn’t.
Did he take that statement that
the agent took from her, the seven
page statement and say, now
didn’t you say something
different?
* * *
You didn’t hear [defense
counsel] try to impeach her with
the statement that she had given to
the agents back in December of
1991.
App. 1991a, 1994a.
    32In fact, the entire situation is
analogous to the typical unremarkable
nonhearsay use of out-of-court
statements.  For example, testimony that
“I heard another tenant in my building
complain to the landlord about a
dangerous condition on the stairs” is
admissible to prove that the landlord had
notice (but not that the stairs were in a
dangerous condition).  In that case,
testimony that someone spoke to the
landlord does not involve any
“statement” at all, and the subject matter
of the conversation is not “offered . . . to
prove the truth of the matter asserted,”
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
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Court committed no error.
Moreover, even if Chester’s
testimony were hearsay, we would not
reverse Mitchell’s conviction, because
the third prong of the Johnson plain error
test is not met.  The “substantial right”
implicated in erroneous admission of
hearsay in a criminal trial is the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause.  See,
e.g., Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.  The
Clause has little weight when the
declarant is actually on the stand, as was
the case here.  Moreover, the whole issue
was collateral (it went only to
credibility), and Mitchell had done a
relatively unconvincing job of
undermining Ms. Chester’s credibility on
cross-examination.  In our view,
rehabilitated or otherwise, the jury would
have given the same weight to Ms.
Chester’s testimony.
VIII.  Conclusion
The judgment of the District Court
will be affirmed.
APPENDIX: Colloquies with the District
Court Regarding Admissibility of
Mitchell’s Proposed Experts.
With the exception of identifying the
prosecutor and defense counsel, the
following transcripts are verbatim the
transcript supplied in this Court.  We
have not attempted to repunctuate it, but
have noted possible errors in
transcription or in speaking. What
follows is the District Court’s colloquy
with counsel following its ruling on the
admissibility of the government’s expert
testimony:
THE COURT:  Counsel, the matter
presently pending before the
Court is in reference to the
defense motion to exclude the
Government’s fingerprint
identification evidence and based
on the Daubert hearing and also
Kumho, this court denies the
defendant’s motion and pursuant
thereto, this court is not going to
make a determination as to the
particular area of scientific
knowledge and technical or
specialized knowledge.  We are
going to grant the motion with
respect to the expert pursuant to
Rule 702 and as stated in Kumho,
not only would it be difficult to
prove, but almost impossible for a
judge to administer evidentiary
rules under which a gatekeeper
obligation depending upon a
distinction between scientific
knowledge and technical or other
specialized knowledge.
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Since there is no clear line
dividing the one from the others
and no convincing need to make
such distinction, therefore, this
court does not feel compelled by
any case authority to make that
distinction in the case before us.
* * *
We find that the Government’s
expert witness at this juncture
appears it’s Duane Johnson [sic,
“Wilbur Johnson”?], an FBI latent
fingerprint examiner who testified
first in the previous trial and those
other latent fingeprint experts that
testified in the Daubert hearing
are capable of testifying in these
proceedings and in that regard, I
am not going to limit the defense
from calling latent fingerprint
experts to testify as to the ability
not to identify or make an
identification from the
fingerprints and I am also going to
allow the defense to call any latent
fingerprint expert who indicates
that fingerprints are not reliable
sources of identification.
Only for that limited purpose
and I am going to exclude
evidence as to whether or not it’s
scientific, technical or whatever. 
It has no relevance before this jury
here.  The question is whether or
not an identification can be made
by examination of
fingerprints—latent
fingerprints—and the record of
this case, as far as the
Daubert hearing will remain intact
with these proceedings and will
go with it through the life of this
case.
* * *
I believe, ultimately, it will be
a factual determination for the
jury to make as to whether or not
there’s been a positive
identification pursuant to
whatever standards are applicable
and make that determination, as
opposed to this court taking
judicial notice of that.
* * *
In that regard, when I am
speaking about the defense
experts, out of the three that
testified—I say “experts” because
they called a paralegal to testify,
but out of the three, the only one
that appears close, based on the
testimony at the Daubert hearing,
would be Dr. David A. Stoney and
I say “close” because a vast
majority of his testimony dealt
with the scientific aspect as
opposed to the latent fingerprint
reliability and his experience from
that background.
All right, you can make your
decisions and at that point in time
that you decide to make or attempt
to call a witness, we will have an
offer of proof and I will entertain
it and make a determination based
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on the offer of proof as to
whether or not the witness will
be allowed to testify as with
any witness.
* * *
THE PROSECUTION: Just a
clarification, your Honor.
You first mentioned that the
defense experts—did I understand
the court correctly with respect to
the sufficiency of the latent
fingerprints in this particular
case?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE PROSECUTION: Okay and that
is likewise—
THE COURT: Such as some of the
witnesses that were used to look at
these latents throughout the
United States.
If they were to call that
fingerprint expert and that
fingerprint expert says, “There is
no way I can make a positive
identification from that latent
fingerprint,” that’s relevant for the
purpose of these proceedings.
THE PROSECUTION: I wanted to
clarify we were talking about
these latents versus the issue of
latents in general.
THE COURT: No, I am not getting
into the issue of latents in general. 
That’s been established.
THE DEFENSE: One quick point of
clarification.  I take it we would
not be permitted to call Professor
Starrs?
THE COURT: Looking at his
testimony from the Daubert
hearing, he would not qualify
under my analysis based on
Rodriguez?
THE PROSECUTION: The Eleventh
Circuit case is U.S. versus Paul.
THE COURT: I am talking about the
Third Circuit case, Vasquez. [sic,
“Velasquez”?]
THE COURT: Anything further?
THE DEFENSE: No, your Honor, not
on this point.
App. 1029a-1034a.
Nothing further appears in the record
on the issue of defense experts until the
morning of jury voir dire, at which the
Court had the following colloquy with
counsel:
 THE DEFENSE: . . . And, in addition,
your Honor, I would like to state on
the record, to clarify my
understanding of this Court’s pretrial
ruling, I discussed it with the
government, I think we are in
agreement as to what the Court’s
ruling was.  In some respects it was
not clear initially to me.  I want, for
appellate purposes to put it on the
record.
THE COURT: What’s that in
reference to, what ruling?
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THE DEFENSE: Referring to your
ruling as to the admissibility or
the partial admissibility of the
fingerprint examiners, in light of
the Daubert hearing, entertained
by the Court.
THE COURT: When was the
Daubert hearing?
THE DEFENSE: It was over the
summer, the exact dates, I don’t
know.  The Court’s ruling was
announced from the bench on
September 13th of last year.
* * *
THE COURT: What specifically did
you have problems
understanding?
THE DEFENSE: Your Honor, what
my understanding of this Court’s
ruling, the defense may call any
witness or examiners which I’m
prepared to do, who formed an
opinion as to the latent prints at
issue.  But, I further understood
the Court to say, I was precluded
from introducing any evidence by
individuals who are of the opinion
that the fingerprint field is of
questionable reliability, given the
lack of testing, the reasons that I
have articulated at the Daubert
proceeding.
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENSE: I would just proffer,
your Honor, that I would call the
same three people that the Court
heard at the hearing, if the Court
had so ruled.
* * *
THE PROSECUTION: I want one
clarification.
* * *
THE PROSECUTION: You also told
them that they could call any
qualified expert, meaning in the
field of fingerprints that would
testify that fingerprints are not
reliable sources of identification.
I mean there’s a slight
difference.  I think the Court ruled
with respect to two of the
witnesses on the 13th, that they
would be excluded.  You did not
preclude Stoney or exclude him in
all respects then but you had made
a ruling, you didn’t—he had not
been fleshed out as an expert in
fingerprints either.  All I’m
saying, that the Court let the
defense try to find experts in the
field that would say that the
fingerprints are not reliable
sources of identification.
THE COURT: I don’t have that
transcript before me.
THE PROSECUTION:  I can hand up
my copy.
* * *
THE COURT: Let me refresh my
recollection as to this whole
hearing, counsel.  I’m somewhat
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at a disadvantage since I
thought this was done.  Let me
refresh.
Specifically, on page four, I
indicated: “I am not going to limit
the defense from calling latent
fingerprint experts to testify as to
the ability not to identify or make
an identification from the
fingerprints and I am also going to
allow the defense to call any latent
fingerprint expert who indicates
that fingerprints are not reliable
sources of identification.”
* * *
THE COURT: Then I said: “Only for
that limited purpose and I am
going to exclude evidence as to
whether or not it’s scientific,
technical or whatever.”
* * *
THE DEFENSE: The government
before that said on page six, your
Honor, in the middle of the page,
line 18.
“The Prosecution: Just a
clarification, your Honor.
You first mentioned that the
defense experts—did I understand
the Court correctly with respect to
the sufficiency of the latent
fingerprints in this particular
case?
The Court: Yes.
The Prosecution: Okay and that is
likewise—
The Court: Such as some of the
witnesses that were used to look at
these latents throughout the
United States.
If they were to call that
fingerprint expert and that
fingerprint expert says, there is no
way I can make a positive
identification from that
fingerprint, that’s relevant for the
purpose of these proceedings.”
THE COURT: That’s what I said, any
latent fingerprint expert, who can
look at these prints and say I can’t
make an identification or I can
make an identification.
THE DEFENSE: As to these
particular prints at issue, that’s it.
THE COURT: That’s it, the only
thing relevant for these
proceedings, right.
THE DEFENSE: Over my objection,
the Court ruled.
THE COURT: Based on the facts that
I made that ruling.
THE DEFENSE: Yes.
THE COURT: Anything further?
THE PROSECUTION: Just again for
clarification, your Honor, not
clarification but the statement, so I
understand on page four, you also
said that they can call any
qualified expert in the field that
would testify that fingerprints are
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not reliable sources of
information, not limited to those
latents, but if they can get a
qualified expert in the fingerprint
field to come in here to say, well,
I’m a qualified expert in
fingerprints.  Fingerprint
identification is not a reliable
source of identification, they have
the option and the ability to do
that?
THE DEFENSE: That’s what we
would have done with Dr. Stoney,
we did at the hearing, that he has
the opinion that the field is of
questionable reliability.
THE COURT: He is going to say, a
scientific and technical
determination?
THE DEFENSE: That the Court ruled
on.
THE COURT: That the Court ruled
on.  That’s fine, that’s complete. 
But, in that regard, though, if you
have a latent fingerprint expert
who will testify, an expert or a
person in latent fingerprints can’t
make a positive identification with
10 points, 15 points, 40 points,
then you are permitted to—you
can call that expert to testify, it
doesn’t have to do with just his
particular points, that one can find
but in general, if you have an
expert, a latent fingerprint expert
that can testify that a person
cannot, a person in the field, an
expert in the field cannot make an
identification, whether it is Mr.
Mitchell’s fingerprints or anyone
else’s fingerprints, based on 10,
20, 15, you are permitted to call
that expert.
* * *
THE DEFENSE: No one to present
the testimony as your Honor
outlined.
THE COURT: I don’t know that.
THE DEFENSE: I’m representing
that.
THE COURT: That’s what you are
representing to the Court.
THE DEFENSE: There would, yes,
sir, there would be Dr. Stoney’s
testimony, that there is—it is of
questionable reliability because
there’s no testing done in the
field.  Not to be redundant, similar
to what he testified to.
THE COURT: The record will
remain as his testimony that you
presented at these proceedings. 
Whether or not you call him in
reference to latent fingerprint
identification is your call.
THE DEFENSE: Right.  That would
be similar to the other two people
that I would call.
THE COURT: Very well.
THE DEFENSE: Simon, Cummins,
Professor Starr.
THE COURT: The other individuals
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that testified at the Daubert
hearing?
THE DEFENSE: Yes.
App. 1065a-1074a.
